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Abstract
The invention of the World Wide Web (Web) has changed forever the way society op-
erates. Communication, shopping, entertainment, have all transformed and nowadays
a large part of humanity depends on the Web for a number of everyday tasks.
In recent years, a new technology appeared. It is called the Internet of Things (IoT)
and assumes the participation in a worldwide network of any device, despite its size,
functionality or purpose. Both the Web and the IoT face a number of security concerns.
The security of the Web is undermined by threats that aim at disrupting its normal
operation, while for the IoT it is the use of proprietary protocols that weaken the inter-
operability between individual devices and the ease of tampering reduces its usefulness.
Fortunately, the industry has knowledge and experience in developing a strong, tamper
resistant device, the smart card. Smart cards are ubiquitous and strengthen a number
of functions (payments, mobile telephony) and are the most secure token in mass pro-
duction. Moreover, in recent years their interconnection capabilities have been further
enhanced and this enhancement made available the hosting of the Smart Card Web
Server (SCWS). The SCWS is a small web server running inside the smart/SIM card.
In this thesis we describe research that by using smart cards and the SCWS, over
standardised protocols, we can enjoy tamper resistant solutions and enhanced security
for the Web. In the same context, we consider a subcategory of the IoT, the Web of
Things (WoT), that is using web-enabled protocols for the IoT and enhance its secu-
rity by means of the combination of smart cards with the SCWS. The feasibility of the
solution is depicted through four use cases, for which architecture and protocols are de-
scribed and the necessary security analysis is conducted. Future work can demonstrate
in practice that the SCWS with smart cards can enhance the security of the Web and
the WoT.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 The World Wide Web
The World Wide Web (Web) has been a reality for almost three decades. The way
that we communicate, are entertained, shop and are informed has changed since the
invention of the Web by Tim Berners Lee in 1989 [1]. Berners Lee may have never
predicted the success of his invention, but the Web is an important part of modern
societies. The invasiveness of the Web is obvious in most traditional human actions.
Nowadays there are banks that operate entirely on the Web, gigantic shops with liter-
ally no physical presence (thus no ‘Bricks and Mortar’) like Amazon or eBay, banking
on the Web is becoming a daily task for a lot of people, even the way people flirt and
date has changed drastically.
Part of the Web’s success, if not the most important, is due to the fact that it is
based on well-established standards, especially when it comes to the protocols that fa-
cilitate communication between entities on the Web. This allows every modern device
- laptops, PCs, smartphones, tablets, watches - to have the ability to connect to remote
web applications and retrieve information that they then display back to the user. The
user just needs a web browser, like Google Chrome, Mozilla Firefox or Opera to see
and interact with this content. The way that this content is retrieved is based on the
client-server model where the client (i.e. the user’s browser) is requesting information
from an entity (the web server) that hosts and/or processes this information or retrieves
it from other entities (e.g. in the form of web services). In this instance the server itself
is acting as a client receiving information from another server [2].
The Web (and the Internet in general) was created in an era when people that had
access to it were few and the access was part of their research and work. This quickly
changed.
The Web is now a field where malicious entities can also profit and this is indeed
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what is happening in reality. Security problems are numerous and they are getting
worse every day. These issues vary in nature and complexity and affect the trust that
certain parts of the society have in the Web.
This insecurity of the Web, the attacks that aim at disrupting the normal operation of
processes running on it, are worsening by the fact that non-standardised protocols and
insecure devices are used in the IoT (as we will see later in this thesis). Distributed
Denial of Service attacks (DDoS) are getting more difficult and expensive to deal with,
since they are now stretching the boundaries of our defenses [3]. Although the aver-
age DDoS attack peaks at approximately 1.5 Gbps, there have been instances where
attacks have peaked at over 1Tbps. Mitigating these attacks is very difficult and even
if it were possible, it would prove to be a very expensive task to undertake. Instances
of criminals or activists trying to disrupt normal services are common [4].
Since mitigating these attacks is monetarily an expensive exercise for companies and
organisations, in the past they have not invested in technologies or infrastructure to do
so. Lately however, in light of recent attacks on large organisations, these entities are
beginning to address security issues and are incorporating their reputations into the
equation when investing in the necessary equipment and personnel.
For criminals to conduct these kinds of attacks they need a large number of devices
under their control. These devices can then on a certain day be instructed to start
a DDoS attack against the victim (in society, individuals or organisations) and have
traditionally used PCs or laptops infected by malware, but now the criminals have
discovered another target. This target is comprised of insecure devices and they are
herding them in the thousands, infecting them with malicious code and forcing them
to participate in DDoS attacks. The main reason that the members of the criminal
community are able to get access to these devices is the weak authentication methods
and the fact that the majority of end users do not change the default login credentials
to access these devices. This thesis will discuss this problem later in detail.
How well authentication methods work on the Web is thus a topic of continuous de-
bate. It is well proven and widely accepted that passwords are now a fairly insecure
method of authentication [5] and discussions on how to stop using passwords as an
important defence mechanism are constant. Risk based authentication [6], adaptive
authentication [7], context aware authentication [8], continuous authentication [9], bio-
metric authentication [10], multi-factor authentication [11] are some of the proposed
answers. However, all these methods have their own challenges and difficulties and are
not always straightforward to implement.
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Another important problem on the Internet, is the security of transactions on e-
commerce sites. There have been numerous attacks against merchants that have re-
sulted in the data theft from millions of credit/debit card holders. Stolen cardholder
information is sold on the Dark Web and depending on the type of card, fetching more
than £30 per card [12]. An important factor, that is not directly affecting the end user,
is the difficulty for merchants to deal with the security controls that the Payment Card
Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) places on merchants [13]. Depending on
the amount of credit/debit card payments that the merchant receives, it may be re-
quired to go through the difficult process of complying to a large number of PCI DSS
requirements (or all depending on the PCI DSS level that the merchant belongs to), a
task that has been proven to be onerous and very expensive.
1.2 Internet of Things/Web of Things
In recent years, another technology made its appearance. It is the Internet of Things
(IoT), which in reality is a network of connected devices of any kind [14]. These devices,
called ‘Things’, act independently or as a group to provide specific services. The basic
idea is that over time, everything will become connected to a network, Local (LAN) or
Wide Area Network (WAN) which could be global. These interconnected devices will
provide all sorts of services, e.g. a sensor to detect environmental changes or a smart
bulb activated by an application, to smart fridges that will inform their owner about
their contents or even a whole house infrastructure that will allow full control of the
entire house remotely.
One would assume that the industry would have learned from all the problems that
the traditional Web has faced (and is still facing) and would have applied the neces-
sary controls on the newer technology that the IoT is. Hence, as mentioned earlier in
this chapter, this did not happen. It is a wide problem that IoT devices have very
weak authentication methods and that they use proprietary protocols for communica-
tion and although weak authentication methods lead to obvious problems, the use of
proprietary protocols may lead to false perception of security since the things cannot
inter-communicate with other things that do not speak the same protocols. Also us-
ing a proprietary protocol that has not gone through public scrutiny is a problem to
security. In an interconnected world, it would have also been assumed that the things
would have been easily accessible using a standard browser and that developing ap-
plications that would incorporate these things would have been quite straightforward.
Unfortunately this is not the case. The result is that we now see isolated islands of
things that are not easily accessible from anything that is not manufactured by the
same company. Interoperability is an important factor for the success of the IoT. At
the same time the security of this technology is still very weak.
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To this extent, research has been conducted for devices to be able to communicate over
well-established protocols instead of proprietary ones [15]. This reasonable idea is for
devices to communicate over web protocols that have been under extensive scrutiny
in terms of security and performance, but are also extremely well supported by every
device that has basic communication abilities. This idea is called the Web of Things
(WoT) and we can consider it a sub-category of the IoT that utilises web technologies
and protocols for communication.
Unfortunately, although the WoT aims at solving (part) of the interconnection prob-
lems, the security problems that exist in the traditional IoT do not disappear in the
WoT. Unauthenticated devices, with minimal levels of security still exist. The problem
is intensified by the fact that these devices can be found in the hands of people that do
not have the expertise in using them securely, thus making these devices more prone to
attacks by malicious entities that try using them for their nefarious actions [16]. This
thesis will propose a solution to this problem.
1.3 Smart Cards
However, the industry has the knowledge and experience of creating small electronic
devices that are extremely tamper resistant. These devices support everyday functions
and they are called smart cards/Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) cards [17]. Another
important and very useful property of a smart card is that it can be securely person-
alised and in certain cases be managed post-issue, thus giving added value to the user.
A smart card is a hardware token that hosts an embedded microprocessor chip, Ran-
dom Access Memory (RAM), Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory
(EEPROM), and Read-Only Memory (ROM) or more recently, Flash memory. A smart
card can be used in many ways: as a credit/debit card for financial transactions, as an
identity card to access restricted areas, as a ticketing solution or inside mobile phones
to assist with cryptographic operations or to provide secure storage. The most signifi-
cant security advantage that a smart card offers is that it is a tamper resistant token
that defends against software and physical attacks.
A smart card can make a specific attack either too difficult and/or expensive or even
infeasible for the perpetrator to launch in terms of equipment or expertise needed, or
even impossible. In a worst case scenario, a smart card will not be able to resist a
specific attack, but will provide proof of the attack. The above tasks that a smart card
offers or assists with, are very important and widely used. However, as this thesis will
propose, we anticipate that smart cards can be used in even more productive ways,
especially when we consider modern smart cards that are equipped with advanced ca-
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pabilities: these advanced capabilities come in the form of more powerful chips, higher
memory capacities, all supplied in small form factors/sizes [18].
The integration of smart cards in the Internet and the IoT/WoT is the main idea
behind this thesis and will be demonstrated through specific use cases.
1.4 Research Question
To help mitigate risks that arise from the above threats and insecurities, the idea to
integrate a smart card into the wider Web, was developed. The industry acknowledges
that a token as secure as a smart card can be used to secure web applications and at
the same time provides a pleasant experience to the end user.
For this to occur the players in the industry designed and adopted a new type of
smart card that is easier to integrate with the Web, is faster and development of ap-
plications with its use are much easier. These cards are the Java Card v3.0 Connected
Edition [19]. They natively support web-based communication and protocols, they
implement a TCP/IP stack, they support a larger version of the Java programming
language compared to traditional Java Card (e.g. multithreading, multi-dimensional
arrays), meaning that they are easier to integrate with the Web and it is much easier to
develop applications for them in comparison to the traditional Java Card. These cards
are also able to support and host a small entity called the Smart Card Web Server
(SCWS). The SCWS is a stripped down HTTP web server that is able to serve web
pages to the user and is easier to integrate in the wider Web. Applications running on
the SCWS are running inside the secure environment that is offered by smart cards,
achieving two goals: interoperability and security.
This thesis tries to provide an answer to the following question: how can we use a
Java Card v3.0 Connected Edition with a Smart Card Web Server to enhance the
security of the aforementioned web applications and to assist in a more secure authen-
tication in the WoT? This will be accomplished by presenting a number of use cases
and protocols that use the SCWS to mitigate specific threats and risks:
1. The first use case will use e-voting process as an example of how we can dis-
tribute the process among a number of ‘personal voting websites’ to help defeating
(D)DoS attacks.
2. The second use case aims at showing how we can use our proposal to ease the
burden of compliance with PCI DSS by demonstrating an alternative way for
purchases that will make e-commerce transactions safer, without sacrificing user
convenience.
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3. The third use case aims at providing a solution to the authentication to web
applications, by using a virtual world as an example. The authentication method
presented in this use case can also be used in risk based authentication scenarios,
whenever an advanced level of authentication is required.
4. The fourth use case will extend our research to the WoT environment, by trying
to recommend an authentication solution that will utilise a distributed single
sign-on infrastracture provided by the SCWS.
All four proposals will use a Java Card v3.0 Connected Edition, hosting the SCWS,
utilising standardised protocols and the tamper resistance offered by modern smart
cards. At the same time the interoperability offered by direct web access (based in
the fact that these cards may also implement a TCP/IP stack), will turn smart cards
into network nodes making it easier to integrate into the wider Web or the WoT. The
use of standardised protocols offers confidence that our solutions will not use ‘security
through obscurity’.
The task was not without challenges. This thesis approaches the topic from a the-
oretical point of view due to lack of equipment conforming to the required standards.
However, formal verification and analysis of the proposed protocols is conducted using
a relevant tool, Scyther. We believe that future research can apply our theoretical
protocol designs and ideas in a real, working Java Card v3.0 Connected Edition.
1.4.1 Basic Assumptions
This thesis will use the following assumptions:
1. Java Card v3.0 Connected Edition is referenced throughout the thesis. This Java
Card version is more suitable for the purposes of this thesis and is preferred, than
Java Card Classic Edition.
2. The SCWS, as defined in the specification, has to support HTTP/1.1.
3. The SCWS has to support the basic TLS versions: TLS 1.0, 1.1 and 1.2, although
the recommendation of this thesis is to use the latest (and more secure) TLS 1.2
version.
1.5 Structure of the Thesis
After this introduction, this thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 discusses smart
cards and Chapter 3 talks about web servers and the Smart Card Web Server. Chapter
4 deals with the protection of e-voting from DDoS attacks by distributing the voting
process across multiple SCWS-enabled smart cards, Chapter 5 discusses the use of the
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SCWS to secure e/m-payments, while Chapter 6 expands the use of the SCWS on a
virtual world environment, dealing with authentication concerns. Chapter 7 pushes
the SCWS into the IoT/WoT realm by introducing the concept of security modules,
i.e. SCWS-enabled smart card chips that may be attached on things to accommodate
authentication on an WoT environment. Chapter 8 concludes this thesis.
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2.1 Introduction
A smart card is a device that hosts an embedded integrated circuit/chip. This chip
provides smart card with the ability to perform calculations, store and execute code
and participate in cryptographic operations. However, not everything that hosts a chip
can be called a smart card - what differentiates smart cards is the fact that they are
relatively small in size and they do not possess power, but they rather require an ex-
ternal entity to provide them with energy to operate. Their physical characteristics are
defined in ISO7816-1 [20]. Another important factor that sets smart cards aside and
puts them in a class of their own, is that they are tamper resistant, whereas very rarely
other chips are, e.g. the ones that are used in common PCs/laptops or other devices
do not provide tamper resistant capabilities.
This ability is proven to be an important factor for the success that smart cards en-
joy. Additionally, smart cards have some form of operating system (OS), however, this
operating system can be considered a relatively primitive one, compared to modern
operating systems. This OS is able to perform basic RAM operations (access to mem-
ory, move data in and out of the RAM) and to control other parts of a smart card,
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like flash memory, ROM and EEPROM. This OS is also able to host certain types of
applications and provide a secure execution environment for cryptographic operations,
although the latter is often or can be taking place inside a cryptographic co-processor
(thus not inside the ‘main’ smart card processor), a processor specially designed and
dedicated for cryptographic operations. This cryptographic co-processor is usually ac-
cessible from the smart card OS and assists the code execution on the main chip, by
enabling much faster execution of symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic functions.
2.2 History of Smart Cards
The first patent for a smart card was registered in 1974 by the French engineer Roland
Moreno - Moreno is considered the inventor of smart cards [21], however the first patent
for a chip card was filled a few years before that, in 1968 by two German engineers,
Ju¨rgen Dethloff and Helmut Gro¨ttrup and also in 1970 the Japanese Dr. Kunitaka
Arimura filled the first patent for the smart card concept. Moreno was the one that
patented the integrated circuit memory card which is the idea employed by modern
smart cards. The first patent that Moreno filled was for a ring embedded with a chip,
but this was proven not successful, so he made certain modifications in 1975 by adding
the chip on a plastic card. This idea was very innovative and gained popularity, first
in France and later to the rest of the world and up to present day.
In 1978, Michel Ugon of Honeywell Bull, invented and patented the microprocessor
smart card. This patent was bought by SGS Thomson and Schlumberger and along
with Bull CP8, led the mainstream market of smart cards. Motorola followed shortly
afterwards.
In 1983, France Te´le´com used Moreno’s smart card as a basis for its Te´le´carte pay
phone, as a means to pay for calls using a prepaid, memory smart card. 1984 was a
very important year in the history of smart cards, with a trial conducted by the French
Postal and Telecommunication services about the use of ATM bank cards with embed-
ded chips. A few years later, in 1992, the French banking industry presented the Carte
Bleue, a debit card for national use. This concept was later expanded to the rest of the
world.
At the beginning of the 20th century, Schlumberger bought the CP8 patent and the
whole department from Bull, merging it with its internal department creating Axalto.
In 2006 Axalto merged with Gemplus (the other worldwide leading smart card manu-
facturer), creating Gemalto, which is one of the leaders in smart card manufacturing
until present day.
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2.3 Smart Card Sizes
Smart cards can come in various types and sizes [18]. The most common type that
people use daily is a rectangular plastic ‘card’ that is approx. 85.60 by 53.98 by 0.76
millimeters. This is the size for cards used in banking operations or for identification
purposes (access cards). A special category of smart card that is in common use today
are the so called Universal Subscriber Identity Modules (USIM) cards that are mostly
known as SIM cards (for their use please see later in this chapter). Full sized SIM
cards (also called 1FF cards) have the same size as ‘normal’ smart cards, but these are
nowadays almost extinct. Modern SIM cards come in three sizes:
1. Mini-SIM (2FF): 25.00 by 15.00 by 0.76 millimetres
2. Micro-SIM (3FF): 15.00 by 12.00 by 0.76 millimetres
3. Nano-SIM (4FF): 12.30 by 8.80 by 0.67 millimetres.
2.4 Basic Standards
Smart cards are well standardised entities, their attributes are well defined in various
standards and this greatly promotes their use in a number of applications. This thesis
will not be involved with low-level technical attributes, however for a better understand-
ing of the thesis, a short description of the basic standards that are used throughout,
will be provided.
2.4.1 ISO/IEC 7816
ISO/IEC 7816 is arguably the most important of all smart card standards [22]. It is
divided into 14 parts that define the physical characteristics of the cards, their electrical
interfaces and protocols used for communication. It also defines commands that are
used to communicate with the smart card and the logical structure of the cards i.e. the
file system and the types of files.
ISO 7816 applies to contact and contactless cards.
2.4.2 ISO/IEC 14443
ISO/IEC 14443 defines the necessary interfaces for the communication with a ‘close
proximity’ contactless smart card [23]. Cards compliant to ISO/IEC 14443 operate
at 13.56 MHz and have an operational range of up to 10 centimeters (3.94 inches).
Near Field Communication (NFC) cards are based on ISO/IEC 14443 and in general
this standard is the basis for a large number of applications used in the financial or
transport field.
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2.4.3 ETSI TS 102 223
European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) Technical Specification (TS)
102 223 ‘Smart Cards; Card Application Toolkit (CAT)’, defines an interface between
the Universal Integrated Circuit Card (UICC) and the terminal [24]. The Card Appli-
cation Toolkit is a set of commands that the UICC can use - the UICC must support
at least one application for access to the network. For example, this application can
be the SIM for 3G or 2G networks or the (U)SIM for 3G networks. This application is
called Network Access Application (NAA).
2.4.4 ETSI TS 102 483
ETSI TS 102 483 [25] defines the way that a UICC can establish an Internet Protocol
(IP) connection with a terminal. The connection will be able to route IP packets and
the specification establishes and describes the way that resources inside the UICC can
be accessed from the terminal using this way.
2.4.5 ETSI TS 102 600
ETSI TS 102 600 describes a Universal Serial Bus (USB) interface between a terminal
and a UICC [26]. The USB interface is very important in instances of an application
that requires a fast data communication protocol (as we can see later in this thesis).
The specification aims at providing interoperability for the communication between the
terminal and the UICC.
2.5 Types of Smart Cards
We can separate smart cards broadly in three categories: contact, contactless and hy-
brid cards. The differentiating factor that separates and categorises cards in these three
categories is based on the way that they communicate with external entities, i.e. with
smart card readers. Early smart cards communicated only through being in contact
with a smart card reader, i.e. the card had to be inserted inside the reader. The reader
provided power to the card and the ability to communicate with other systems, e.g. a
laptop or a bank end bank system. Although this type of function is still widely used
for smart cards, in recent years smart cards acquired the ability to communicate with
readers without physical contact to them, i.e. contactless. The card has to either be
in very close proximity with the reader (almost touching it) or it can operate from a
distance, usually of a few centimetres. The latter is usually an NFC or Bluetooth en-
abled card. Hybrid or dual interface cards can function either as contact or contactless
cards - the operating mode depends on the reader and its abilities (thus if the reader
can support contactless connections).
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Another way to differentiate smart cards is by categorising them based on ‘how smart’
they really are. Thus we can speak of memory cards and cards with a Central Pro-
cessing Unit (CPU). The first category is comprised of cards that contain a memory
where a value is stored. This value may or may not be changeable (thus the memory is
writable or not) and is more frequently used as phone or prepaid/rechargeable cards.
Phone cards for example can be bought with a predefined amount of money and can
be used until this amount reaches zero. At this point the card is useless and cannot be
used again. A rechargeable card can be found e.g. in hotels where the guest tops up
the card with a certain amount of money for purchases on premises and can recharge
the card if it runs out of money.
Cards with a CPU on the other hand are generally, ‘smarter’. The fact that they
possess a CPU provides them with the ability to run and execute complex calculations.
A smart card is able to even run cryptographic operations (symmetric or asymmetric),
but sometimes for this type of functionality a secondary processor (crypto co-processor)
is used (a fact that raises the price of the smart card). The crypto co-processor is a
specially designed processor that can natively run crypto commands - these commands
are usually executed in native code that runs directly on the processor, instead of be-
ing executed as a program/function on top of an operating system. Usually, this type
of smart card possesses an operating system. This OS is different than ‘normal’ OSes
(found on other devices, like laptops or PCs), in that it does not possess a user interface
and generally the user cannot access and execute commands on it. However, this OS is
capable of executing tasks like ‘normal’ operating systems do, for example it controls
access to RAM and provides an environment for the execution of on-card applications.
2.6 Smart Card Operating Systems
There are two dominant smart card operating systems:
2.6.1 Java Card
A Java Card as the name implies, is a smart card that is able to run applications
written in the Java programming language. In reality, these applications are utilising a
subset of Java, since supporting the full version of Java is impossible, given the resource
constrained nature of the cards.
The idea behind the use of Java Card is identical to the one that led to the creation of
Java, as a programming language, itself. The ability of a Java program to be run on
every smart card platform that supports the execution of Java programs without the
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need for re-compiling it. In practice this is achieved in the same way that a traditional
Java program is executed. The underlying Java Card Virtual Machine (JCVM) runs
below the Java Card API (JCAPI). The JCAPI is a set of libraries and functions that
a Java Card application, which in the realm of Java Cards is called an applet, can call
during its execution and can be seen as a layer running on top of the JCVM, exposing
Java Card functionality to the on-card applications. The purpose of the Java Card
Virtual Machine is to provide the environment that will enable Java Card applets to
run, without having to worry about portability issues, thus implementing the ‘Write
Once, Run Anywhere’ motto of the Java language. The JCVM is the mechanism that
loads Java classes and executes them.
Both the JCVM and JCAPI comprise the Java Card Runtime Environment (JCRE).
The JCRE defines the requirements under which a Java Card application can run.
The development of a Java Card applet is not radically different compared to the de-
velopment of ‘normal’/conventional Java applications. A programmer writes the Java
Card code that then compiles. This produces a number of Java Card classes. Usually
the applet is not executed on an actual Java Card, but rather the programmer is using
a simulation tool running on a PC. The simulation tool provides an estimate of the
execution speed and will provide indications as to whether the applet will be able to
run on a real card. Running on a simulation, allows for easier debugging and correction
of programming errors.
If the simulation satisfies the requirements and expectations of the programmer, it
is converted to a CAP (converted applet). For this purpose, the programmer will use
a Java Card Converter, which is a tool specifically designed to combine all classes into
a Java Card package. This stage also includes the verification of the CAP file by using
a bytecode verifier that checks the CAP file and ensures that it has the correct format.
This process additionally identifies and stops any malicious application that wants to
find its way to the smart card.
Once this conversion is finished, the CAP is ready to be transferred to the card. This is
the ‘download’ phase. Usually, a card reader attached to a PC is used for this purpose
and a special installation tool must be running on the PC for this task to be completed.
The installation tool ‘downloads’ the CAP onto the card and an on-card installation
application prepares the applet for execution on the Java Card. The virtual machine
is now ready to run the applet.
Each of the applets is run inside a ‘Security Context’. Indeed a firewall separates
applets and isolates them into their own memory sections, blocking any access to this
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context from other applets or themselves to access contexts where other applets reside.
Applets that were developed by the same entity, can also access data stored in other
contexts, as long as they share the same cryptographic key material.
2.6.2 Java Card v3.0
Java Card v3.0 is available in two different versions:
• Java Card v3.0 Classic Edition, which is an evolution of the Java Card v2.2.2
version and it is destined for smart cards of lower specifications [27].
• Java Card v3.0 Connected Edition, which is an advancement in smart card tech-
nology. Although it is compatible with applications/applets written for older
smart cards or the Classic Edition, it introduces a number of improvements [19].
This version is destined for smart cards of advanced capabilities, with bigger
memory and higher processing power.
2.6.2.1 Java Card v3.0 Connected Edition
Java Card v3.0 Connected Edition is a network-oriented version of smart card technol-
ogy, that allows for direct integration with TCP/IP networks and the execution of web
applications. Applications running on Java Card v3.0 Connected Edition can directly
integrate with the Web and other IP networks and be accessed over standardised pro-
tocols like HTTP/HTTPS.
A Java Card v3.0 Connected Edition supports a wider version of the Java technol-
ogy:
• It allows for multiple threads to run concurrently (multithreading).
• It supports a wider version of the Java programming language, e.g. multi-
dimensional arrays, strings, integers, etc.
• It uses a garbage collector to remove session data that are no longer needed.
• It allows for on-card bytecode verification, which allows for the application’s class
files to be verified on-card, whereas with most of other versions of Java Card, the
verification happens off-card.
Java Card v3.0 Connected Edition additionally offers another important advancement.
As mentioned above, it is a smart card fully capable to integrate directly with TCP/IP
networks and offer services over web applications. This is done through the implemen-
tation of a TCP/IP stack on the card and the hosting and execution of web applications
that are running directly on the card. For the latter, the Smart Card Web Server is
used (please see Chapter 3 for more information).
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The ability for a smart card to directly integrate in a network, allows for exciting op-
portunities as the card effectively becomes a network node directly accessible by other
network nodes.
Java Card v3.0 Connected Edition is the Java Card version that is assumed throughout
this thesis.
2.6.3 MULTOS
The second most important smart card OS is MULTOS [28]. The development of
this OS is overseen by a consortium of companies that includes card manufacturers,
application providers, payment card schemes, etc. Everyday tasks relating to MUL-
TOS are run by MAOSCO - MAOSCO is also responsible for the development of OS
specifications, publication of white papers and general representation of the OS to the
industry. As with Java Card, MULTOS is using a virtual machine to run applications
in the MULTOS Executable Language (MEL). Similarly to Java Card, applications are
developed and tested off card by using various development tools. For this, developers
can write their code in a programming language and then this code is translated/com-
piled into the MULTOS specific language, MEL. The derived MEL bytecodes are then
transferred onto the card and are run by the MULTOS virtual machine. This way and
for as long as there exist compilers that can translate code developed in a programming
language to MEL, programmers can write their code using their preferred language.
Their programs can then be run on any MULTOS card without a problem. However,
in practice two main languages are used (C and Java).
The application is signed by the application provider (using their private key). The
public key is transmitted to the card issuer and through them to MULTOS and more
specifically to the MULTOS Key Management Authority (KMA) that plays a central
part in the whole scheme. MULTOS signs the public key of the application provider
and creates a certificate that is loaded on the card in the form of the Application Load
Certificate (ALC). Another certificate that is created and also stored on the card is
the Application Delete Certificate (ADC) that is used when the application needs to
be deleted from the card. MULTOS public keys are then inserted into the Applica-
tion Load Unit (ALU) along with the code and other data provided by the application
provider. The Application Load Unit is a package that the application provider uses
to pack the application’s data and code with the aforementioned keys that are then
loaded on the card. An application is allowed to run on the card, if the verification
process succeeds. The responsible entity for providing all this cryptographic assistance,
is the MULTOS KMA.
The above process ensures that applications can be loaded even in insecure environ-
ments, because the protection and integrity of the code is ensured by this architecture.
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As is the case with Java Cards, each application is separated by the rest using a firewall.
Applications cannot access memory, information and data that belong to other appli-
cations and this ensures the integrity and confidentiality of the execution environment.
Because of this architecture, MULTOS is considered a secure smart card OS and is
generally preferred in cases where a higher level of security is desirable.
2.7 Main Components of the Smart Card
A smart card is comprised of the following parts [18]:
2.7.1 Central Processing Unit (CPU)
A CPU is the central point of intelligence for a smart card. As with a traditional
Personal Computer (PC) a CPU is the part that controls the execution of commands.
Traditionally, a CPU was an 8-bit microcontroller, but in more recent years 16-bit and
even 32-bit are more common. The increase in processing power allows a smart card
to execute more complicated commands and thus, to host more advanced applications
(or applets in the case of Java Cards).
When a smart card is required to participate in cryptographic operations, it usually
bears a second CPU. This is a special purpose CPU that is specially customised to run
cryptographic operations. The customisation is due to the fact that all cryptographic
operations do not execute on the application or operating system level, but rather are
instructions written in native language and execute directly on the hardware. This
means that these operations can run much faster. This CPU is usually called crypto
co-processor. Whenever a complex cryptographic operation needs to run, the main
CPU off-loads the entire execution to the crypto co-processor that executes the cryp-
tographic operation(s) and returns the result to the main CPU for further processing.
2.7.2 Memory
A smart card has the following types of memory. These memory types are:
2.7.2.1 Read Only Memory - ROM
This is the type of memory that hosts the operating system and other code that is
not changed for the lifetime of the card. Its contents cannot be changed, as it is a
non-volatile type of memory, which means that its contents are retained even when the
card does not receive power.
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2.7.2.2 Electrically Erasable Programmable ROM - EEPROM
This is the type of memory that hosts the code for the applications that will execute
on the card. It also provides the storage for content that needs to be stored on the
card, e.g. phone numbers and other information. As such it is a non-volatile type of
memory and it comes in sizes from 128 bytes to 1MB.
2.7.2.3 Flash Memory
A faster alternative to the above is a newer type of memory, flash memory. Flash
memory can be used as a non-volatile memory space, replacing slower alternatives (e.g.
EEPROM) offering faster read access times.
2.7.2.4 Random Access Memory - RAM
This is the smallest type of memory that exists on a smart card and it is used by
applications running on the card as the place where fast computation can occur. Due
to the fact that it is quite fast, it is able to execute commands with the minimum delay.
It is a volatile type of memory and loses all its contents when the card is not powered
up.
2.7.3 File Structure
According to ISO 7816-4 [29], a smart card has a hierarchical file structure. The three
types of files that exist on a smart card are the Master File (MF), the Dedicated File
(DF) and the Elementary File (EF). At the top of the file system sits the MF which,
unarguably, is considered the root under which the rest of the smart card file system
exists. A MF is selected after the initialisation of the smart card and contains every
other file present on the smart card. It cannot be deleted.
On a second level, there are a number of ‘intermediate’ files, called Dedicated Files
(DF). A MF is a special type of a DF. A DF may contain other DFs and theoretically
there is no limit on the number of DFs that can exist under a specific DF, but in
practice due to memory limitations there are only 2 levels of DF files.
The last level of files are the Elementary Files (EF). They are used to store data
and depending on the application they have a specific file structure. An EF is the most
basic type of file and cannot contain other files. There are ‘external’ or working EFs
that are used for application storage and are accessible by external, to the card, entities
(e.g. applications running on the phone) and internal EFs that contain data used by
the operating system and are accessed by it only.
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2.7.3.1 Data Structure
EF files have four different types for data structure:
1. Linear fixed: data are grouped into records of a predefined size.
2. Linear variable: data are grouped into records of a variable size.
3. Cyclic: it can be considered a special type of Linear Fixed type as it is of fixed
size. However, when a cyclic file is full the first record is overwritten. This type
of structure was used to store Short Message Service (SMS) messages, where
whenever the file was full, the first SMS was replaced by the last one.
4. Transparent: it is a block of data without a data structure. Data are accessed as
a reference/offset from the beginning of the data block.
2.8 Smart Cards Main Uses
Smart cards can be used in a number of different ways. Depending on the use case,
smart cards of a certain type can be used (e.g. memory cards, or cards with a chip) [17].
2.8.1 Payphones
Payphone cards were very popular especially during the 90s. Users were buying prepaid
cards that they could then use with payphones. Once the credit on the card ran out,
the user had to buy another card.
2.8.2 Mobile Communications
A special category of smart cards can be found inside a phone and they are the called
Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) cards. These cards provide cryptographic assistance
to mobile communications, since they can securely store cryptographic keys that are
used to encrypt the communication between the phone and the cell tower and also help
identify the subscriber to the network. The SIM cards can also be used as application
hosts through the existence of the SIM toolkit (where applications are running inside
the SIM and could be accessed from the phone) or secure storage e.g. for contact lists.
A large large number of smart cards in circulation, is comprised of SIM cards [30]. For
more information on SIM cards, see the relevant section later in this chapter.
2.8.3 Banking
Another very important usage for smart cards is when they are used for banking pur-
poses. Most of the debit or credit cards in a number of countries are now smart cards,
whereas the old, swipe cards are now being replaced. The tamper resistance abilities
of smart cards provide an excellent choice as alternatives to cash. Debit or credit cards
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can provide the environment for cryptographic operations to securely execute and their
ability to provide exactly this secure operating environment gives them an important
place for banking operations. They can authenticate themselves to the reader, but can
also authenticate the reader as being genuine, thus avoid communicating with malicious
readers.
2.8.4 Prepaid Cards for Retail
A smart card can also be used to store a prepaid amount of money that can be used to-
wards purchases, e.g. visitors of a hotel can be provided with a prepaid smart card that
they can then use against purchases inside the hotel. These cards can be ‘recharged’
with money, thus providing the person with an easy way for purchasing products. A
special case for this type of card is transport cards (e.g. Oyster in London). These
cards can be recharged with a specific amount of money and when the value is zero
or below a threshold, they can be topped up automatically or using special machines.
The user can touch her card on the station gates and depending on the monetary value
that already exists on the card, determines whether the automatic gates open or not
2.8.5 ID Verification and Access Control
As mentioned before, smart cards possess the necessary computational power to run
cryptographic operations and to authenticate themselves whenever needed. This ability
can be exploited when smart cards are used for identification purposes. The card stores
authentication details for the user in question and can provide these to legitimate read-
ers (since it can participate in mutual authentication operations, meaning it can avoid
malicious readers). The card can store from a single password to private asymmetric
keys and even biometric information that can then be used to reliably identify the user.
2.9 Smart Cards Certification
Smart card manufacturers ensure the security of their products by certifying them
against specific frameworks. The most prolific are Common Criteria (CC) and Federal
Information Processing Standards (FIPS).
2.9.1 Common Criteria
This certification framework is a globally recognised method of evaluating the security
of smart card implementations [31]. An evaluation based on CC will prove the security
capabilities of smart cards, physically and logically. A CC evaluation can be used to
compare different products and provide assurance to customers that a certain product
meets specific security requirements.
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A protection profile is a group of security requirements for a specific type of smart card
and is the basis for CC certification. A protection profile defines the Target of Evalua-
tion (ToE), which basically is the subject of evaluation. A protection profile will then
provide the requirements that the specific evaluation will be based on e.g. certifying a
firewall or an antivirus requires different requirements thus different protection profiles.
The evaluation assurance level (EAL) provides a measurement of how well the spe-
cific product fulfils the security requirements as defined in the protection profile. The
product then is assigned a value that categorises it according to the CC levels (EAL
1-7). Most smart cards are evaluated to EAL4+.
A security target (ST) is a specific description of the ToE, the threats that it faces,
implementation of specific countermeasures against these threats and the level of cer-
tification that the product achieved.
It must be noted that CC do not just apply to smart cards only, but also to soft-
ware and hardware implementations can be certified against this framework.
2.9.2 Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS)
FIPS is a standard developed and maintained by the US government and has a different
role compared to Common Criteria. FIPS has four levels of certification and applies to
cryptographic modules only (compared to the more generic nature of CC). Each of the
levels defines a certain group of requirements that a cryptographic product has to fulfil
in order for the latter to be included in this specific level. The lowest level is Level-1
and the highest is Level-4. Current FIPS version is FIPS 140-2 [32], but it is expected
to be replaced by FIPS 140-3 in the future.
2.10 GlobalPlatform
GlobalPlatform is a non-profit organisation that defines a framework under which card
issuers can create smart cards that will allow the hosting of multiple applications on
them [33]. Application lifecycle is a very important aspect and GlobalPlatform aims
at defining a secure way for these applications to execute. The focus is for the security
of the smart card to not be compromised. For this purpose, GlobalPlatform defines
the notion of ‘Security Domains’. A security domain is a part of the smart card that
allows the storage and execution of an application that is provided by the entity that
is in possession of the cryptographic keys that can be securely stored on this domain.
The application provider signs the application using these cryptographic materials and
the application can then execute in this domain only. If someone tries to run another
application in this domain, this will fail as the malicious entity will not be able to
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sign the application with the correct keys (since these keys are handled solely by the
legitimate entity that manages this specific domain). The existence of security domains,
blocks any application from trying to access another security domain (and thus the
resources stored on this domain).
2.11 Smart Cards Security
There are generally three types of attacks against smart cards:
2.11.1 Attacks
2.11.1.1 Fault/Logical Attacks
Software attacks that try to exploit software vulnerabilities/bugs. An example is when
an attacker tries to access files on the smart card that have certain permissions [34].
2.11.1.2 Side-channel Attacks
Side-channel attacks are based on data gained from the collection of information of
certain physical attributes of the implementation of a smart card-based system [35].
In this case, an attacker can collect information from electromagnetic leaks, power
consumption or timing information and can then try to retrieve data stored inside the
smart card that otherwise would not have been able to, e.g. encryption/decryption keys.
An example is the case where an attacker can get the smart card encryption/decryption
key by identifying the difference in time needed for certain commands to execute,
e.g. well known attacks against RSA implementations on smart cards where a certain
function (squaring) requires/consumes less power to execute compared to another one
(multiplication).
2.11.1.3 Hardware/Invasive Attacks
Attacks of this nature are usually very invasive and require direct access with the smart
card. For these attacks to succeed, the attacker needs to use a number of tools that
will allow her to abuse the card in order to be able to get the necessary information or
simply disrupt the smart card execution. One way of doing this is by inserting probes
on the smart card to detect all traffic over the bus.
In order for smart card manufacturers to combat these attacks, they have implemented
certain countermeasures [18]. A non-exhaustive list follows.
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2.11.2 Smart Card Security
2.11.2.1 Secure Architecture - Protective Shields
A protective shield tries to stop physical attacks against the smart card. The shield
aims at resisting e.g. probes from being inserted in the smart card and trying to
eavesdrop on bus communication.
2.11.2.2 Data Bus Encryption
Another way to avoid bus eavesdropping is by encrypting data that are transferred over
the bus.
2.11.2.3 Obfuscation
By obfuscating smart card parts (thus randomising the location e.g. of memory or the
processor), smart card manufacturers aim at stopping an attacker from being able to
map and identify smart card parts, which then makes it even more difficult for her to
launch specialised attacks.
The next section will discuss about the Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) cards.
2.12 Mobile Telephony and Subscriber Identity Module
(SIM) Cards
1st generation mobile telephony (called 1G) was analog-based and the first digital net-
work came into existence with the second generation (2G), also called GSM (Global
System for Mobile Communications) in Europe.
Early mobile networks (1st and 2nd generation) were vulnerable to a number of se-
curity attacks. Some of the most usual were the ease for eavesdropping (1G), as well
as insecure cryptographic algorithms (2G). More specifically, the absence of encryption
capabilities and the non-existence of a secure module was a major problem with 1st
generation mobile telephony. Anyone, with the relevant equipment, could intercept all
communication from a target mobile phone. At the same time, the absence of a secure
module, meant that there was not a secure way to authenticate the user to the network
and phone fraud was relatively easy, since the attackers could seem as the legitimate
subscriber and place phone calls charging her instead. 1G networks also suffered from
poor quality, regular line drops and inefficient use of the spectrum due to the analog
nature of the technology.
2G mobile networks tried to change this. 2G was the first digital mobile network
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technology. This alone was a big step, but maybe an even bigger step was the existence
of a small module/card on the phone, what is called the Universal Integrated Circuit
Card (UICC) or more commonly known as Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) card.
The UICC is basically the actual card, the hardware, whereas the SIM is an appli-
cation running on top of it, however in bibliography and everyday use the term SIM
card is used to describe both. It must be noted however that SIM cards in 3G and 4G
networks are instead called Universal Subscriber Identity Modules (USIM) cards, offer-
ing larger storage, richer attributes (e.g. can store email addresses in the contact list)
and allows for higher speed connections and support for Internet Protocol (IP) traffic.
Throughout this text the term (U)SIM or SIM card will be used interchangeably.
The main purpose of the SIM card is to contain the International Mobile Subscriber
Identity (IMSI) and the secret key (Ki). The IMSI is usually a 15-digit number that
uniquely identifies the subscriber - no two SIM cards will ever have the same IMSI.
The IMSI is extremely secure and sensitive and is rarely published/transmitted in or-
der to mitigate against attacks such as eavesdropping. Instead a randomly generated
Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity (TMSI) is created and used instead. The TMSI
is sent every time that the SIM/phone moves to a new geographic location. As men-
tioned above, the IMSI is rarely being sent and usually this happens when the phone
is switched on.
The Ki is a secret key that is stored on the SIM card, but also on the mobile net-
work premises and it is used as part of the authentication process. The authentication
process initiates when the phone is switched on and on the mobile network side the Ki,
along with the authentication algorithm (A3) and a 128-bit random number (RAND)
are used to generate a 32-bit signed response (SRES). At the same time, a ciphering
key (Kc) is generated using Ki, RAND and the A8 algorithm and this will later be used
to encrypt the communication with the phone.
The RAND is then sent to the mobile device that forwards it to the SIM. The SIM
uses the RAND, the Ki and the A3 algorithm to produce the SRES* that sends to the
network. The network checks if the SRES is the same as the SRES* and authenticates
(or not) the SIM and subsequently, the subscriber. The SIM also calculates the Kc
from Ki, RAND and A8. From the above it is obvious that the security of the whole
process depends on the security of Ki. Thus, the Ki is protected by being stored on the
tamper resistant device that the SIM is, and is not allowed to be read by any entity. It
is only used inside the SIM card and never travels outside of it.
From then on the communication can be encrypted using Kc and the encryption algo-
rithm A5. The A5 algorithm creates a 114-bit stream that is then XORed with the data
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– this stream changes very often to improve security. In fact there are more than one
A5 algorithms, A5/1, A5/2, A5/3, etc. and can be used in cases where a country does
not allow a certain type of algorithms or if one of the algorithms is found to be insecure.
Unfortunately, the A5/2 algorithm was proven to be extremely insecure, since it was
designed to be used in countries with restrictions on the use of cryptography. Using the
A5/2 algorithm is very dangerous since it is quite trivial for an attacker to retrieve the
Kc. Combined with a ‘false base station’ attack, this can be used to retrieve the Kc.
The false base station is an attack where a false station can be placed very close to the
victim, retrieves information encrypted using the A5/1 algorithm and forces the victim
to fall back to the A5/2 algorithm. The false station can then be used to retrieve the
Kc and decrypt all previous intercepted communication.
It is easily understood that the security of the entire GSM network is based on the
tamper resistance attributes of a SIM card, since a SIM card must be able to impose
big obstacles to anyone trying to physically access the Ki or the IMSI. This is the main
use of a SIM card and this remains true even for modern mobile networks, i.e. third
(3G) and fourth generation (4G).
The SIM card was also used as a medium for the mobile network operator to store
and execute programs. Historically, this was done via the SIM application toolkit
(SAT) [36]. What the SAT was doing, was to present to the user information about
news, the weather, etc. as a response to a request from the user - the user could use a
specific application to browse a menu and sees the information on the phone. However,
with recent advances on mobile phones technology (smartphones), this functionality is
currently not important and in more advanced countries, is practically extinct. For
more information on mobile telephony, see [37].
2.13 Conclusion of the Chapter
In this chapter we described the tamper resistant token, the smart card, which its
use we are going to be assuming throughout this thesis. We provided a brief history of
smart cards, their basic physical characteristics and the most important standards that
govern them. We provided an overview of the main components of the smart card, the
most important operating systems that reside on a smart card and the certifications
that a manufacturer can aim at acquiring for a smart card. Finally we gave a synopsis
of the main attacks against smart and mitigation techniques that can be used, before
concluding with the representation of the smart card type that we are going to be
referencing in this thesis, the SIM card. The next chapter will provide an overview of
the World Wide Web and the Smart Card Web Server.
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In the previous chapter we provided a description of smart cards, before proceeding in
this chapter with the presentation of the second important component of this thesis,
the Smart Card Web Server (SCWS).
Prior to describing the SCWS, it is important to give an outline of the World Wide Web
(Web) and some of the main types of threats against it. These threats are chosen be-
cause we will try to mitigate them through the use of a smart card and an SCWS. The
latter entity (the SCWS) will be presented in detail in this chapter, before proceeding
with the illustration of its use in the next chapters.
3.1 Introduction
When Tim Berners-Lee created the first instance of the World Wide Web, he may have
never thought how this will evolve in the future. It is true that the Web dominates a
large part of our everyday lives and it has indeed changed the way that society operates.
Unfortunately, although the Web is one of the most exciting inventions of the twentieth
century, it brings along a number of challenges. Security concerns are at the top and
it is an unfortunate fact that security incidents are very common.
Three of the most common security concerns will be investigated in this thesis. The
first is the Denial of Service attacks, the second is the authentication problems on the
Web and the Web of Things and the third is about credit/debit card data security and
compliance.
3.2 Security
3.2.1 Denial of Service Attacks
A Denial of Service (DoS) attack is any attack that aims at rendering a victim system
inaccessible and not able to respond to requests from legitimate entities [38]. The basic
idea is to consume as many (or all) of the resources of the victim system - in this case
the system will not be able to fulfil requests or its answers will be so slow that it will be
practically unusable. In the case of network DoS attacks, the attacker is using only one
system against the victim, but there are also attacks aiming at specific vulnerabilities
that exist on a system, e.g. an attacker may install a malicious program that at a
specific moment will create a large number of processes that will consume the available
memory or will start writing on the disk, thus consuming space making the system
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unusable.
3.2.1.1 DoS Attacks Methods
There are many types of DoS attacks and an indicative number of them is presented
below:
1. Ping of Death: This is one of the oldest attacks and there are not many systems
that are still vulnerable, as most of the vendors have long ago created patches for
this attack [39]. Historically, a ping of death was a very successful attack, affecting
a number of systems. This type of attack occurs when an attacking systems sends
a malformed, malicious ping to a victim computer (ping is a command sent to
detect if the receiving system is live or not). The maximum IPv4 packet including
the header is 65535 bytes. The Data Link layer has a limit on the maximum
frame size that it can handle, which is 1500 bytes on an Ethernet connection.
Thus a large IP packet has to be split in multiple smaller packets (sometimes
called fragments) in order for it to reach its destination where all fragments are
reassembled. An attacker can manipulate the size of the fragments that she sends
to the victim and send a larger overall packet than the one that the receiver can
handle. In this instance the victim cannot handle the larger packet and it crashes.
2. Teardrop attacks: Teardrop attack is a DoS attack that is achieved by sending a
number of fragmented packets to a victim system [40]. Due to a bug in TCP/IP
fragmentation reassembly, the victim machine cannot properly reassemble the
receiving packets and thus it crashes. Every IP header includes a fragment offset
field that indicates the relative position of the data that the fragmented packet
contains against the data in the original packet. If the sum of the offset and the
size of data in a fragmented packet are different than the ones of the packet that
comes after it, then the packets overlap. This can cause a system crash, as the
latter cannot properly reassemble the receiving packets. While this is a quite old
attack, a newer version of it affected Windows Vista and Windows 7 [41].
3. Fork bomb: During this attack, a malicious program creates a process on a victim
system [42]. This process creates (forks) another process, which creates another
process and so forth. Quickly all available resources on the system are consumed
and it crashes or becomes slow to respond.
3.2.2 Distributed Denial of Service Attacks
A Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack is a more advanced and catastrophic
one, since it involves multiple attacking devices, which is not the case of DoS attacks. In
most occurrences, a DDoS is conducted through the use of compromised devices (called
zombies) that co-operate to attack a victim device. The owners of these machines may
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not even know that they are participating in an attack and this is a big risk, since
they cannot stop something that they are not aware that is happening. The attacker is
controlling this large group of devices (that can be up to hundreds of thousands) that
is called a botnet, through the use of a Command and Control Centre. The attacker
can then send an initiating command to these zombies that they start sending traffic
against the victim device. Depending on the amount of traffic and the defences of the
victim, this excessive amount of traffic may or not be absorbed.
3.2.2.1 DDoS Attacks Methods
1. Smurf attacks: A smurf attack, is one of the oldest distributed DoS attacks.
During a smurf attack, the attacker sends multiple Internet Control Message
Protocol (ICMP) ping requests to multiple recipients. However, it does so as to
seem that these pings come from another entity, i.e. the victim system (this is
called spoofing). The result is that all systems that received a ping will reply
back to the spoofed system that may not be able to cope with all these requests
and may crash, slow down or become unresponsive [43].
2. Volumetric attacks (layers 3 and 4): These types of DDoS attacks can be con-
sidered a form of brute force, since their main vector of realisation is to flood a
target with traffic that saturates the available bandwidth. Usually these attacks
are not very sophisticated, but use excessive power to bring down a target. This
overloading of the capacity of the victim network forbids access to legitimate users
and can bring down a server in a very short period. These attacks target mainly
the network level, thus layers 3 and 4 of the TCP/IP protocol stack [44] [45].
3. Volumetric attacks (layer 7): These are more sophisticated attacks compared to
the ones mentioned in the previous section. An example of such attack is the
HTTP flood where the attacker forces a number of zombies to send POST or
GET requests to the victim server. The server tries to reply to all these requests,
but if these requests are very resource intensive or originate from multiple sources,
then the server cannot cope with all this traffic, causing it to crash or simply slow
down or become unusable [44] [45].
3.2.3 IoT-based Attacks
A defining period for these types of attacks can be considered the autumn 2016 where
the worst DDoS attacks ever reported, took place. Attacks against the website ‘Krebs
on Security’, the French hosting provider OVH and the DNS provider DYN, are at-
tributed to compromised things of the Internet of Things that were infected by the
Mirai malware. This malware turned these things into zombies and forced them to
participate in huge DDoS attacks [46]. All these incidents were very powerful attacks,
with heavy traffic destined against victim systems. Akamai, the company providing
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DDoS protection to the ‘Krebs on Security’ website, had to take the website oﬄine,
since a full mitigation would have cost millions of dollars. A very big concern with these
types of attacks is that they can easily be used by script kiddies that browse the Dark
Web and pay for these types of services - this is now called DDoS-as-a-service. Code
for Mirai and other malware is also publicly available and even people with limited
technical expertise can now use this code to try and infect insecure things, that will
subsequently be used as attacking nodes. The entire process is enhanced due to the
fact that a vast majority of things are natively insecure [47] and thus very easy targets
for infection.
3.2.3.1 DDoS Attacks Mitigation
Mitigating a DDoS attack can occur in the following ways [48]:
1. By extending the internet capacity of the website/system under question. How-
ever, this is not always feasible.
2. By using a Domain Name System (DNS)-based cloud service that will perma-
nently forward traffic destined for a specific website to a mitigating service that
will then deliver clean traffic, by changing the DNS A-record to point to the
mitigation provider’s infrastructure. DNS requests are now resolved by the anti-
DDoS DNS servers that are now the authoritative DNS servers for the domain
under question.
3. By using a Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) based cloud service that will receive
the malicious traffic during the attack and will forward back to the victim the
clean traffic. This protection is either ad-hoc and occurs when there is an actual
attack or can be always-on. This is called BGP anti-DDoS protection and it is
implemented by switching from the victim’s Autonomous System to that of its
mitigation provider. The latter can then pass the malicious traffic through its
scrubbing service and deliver the clean traffic.
4. Another option is when the anti-DDoS protection is offered directly from the
internet service provider. E.g. Level 3 claim that they can avoid DDoS attacks
up to 4.5 Tbps [49]. This is an always-on protection and differs from the second
option in the sense that no DNS changes are needed, but the traffic is directly
filtered on the ISP.
After discussing about DDoS attacks and mitigation techniques, we are now going to
present the second threat that affects the security on the Internet and this is about
insecure authentication.
3.2.4 Web Authentication
There are two standardised ways to authenticate on the Web:
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1. Basic Access Authentication. It is the most primitive way to authenticate on the
Web. The client is presented with a pop up window into whichshe enters the
authentication credentials (username and password). The credentials are trans-
mitted unencrypted, unless protected by another layer, e.g. TLS. Basic Access
Authentication uses Base64 encoding. It is considered as a non secure way for
authentication [50].
2. Digest Access Authentication. Digest Access Authentication is an improvement
over Basic Access Authentication, in the sense that the username/password pair
is not sent in cleartext. Instead an MD5 of the username and password is sent,
along with a nonce (that was generated by the server and sent to client) plus a
number of other values (e.g. the requested Uniform Resource Identifier(URI)).
Again, everything is transmitted over HTTP by default, unless a secure protocol
is used, e.g. TLS [50].
3.2.4.1 Form Authentication
In practice web developers and administrators are using non-standardised ways for user
authentication. This is usually in the form of an Hypertext Markup Language (HTML)
login form/web page. The user is presented with a form that requires a username and
password before she is allowed access to protected/private information. This username
and password pair is usually selected by the user and specifically for password selection
there may not exist a password strength check. This creates the problem that the
organisation holds a lot of passwords being insecure. This is further compounded by
the use of easy to remember and/or passwords that are used for other websites the
user may have accounts on, as the users choose passwords that are easy to remember
and/or are used with other websites as well. Password re-use is a big problem for the
modern Web and various methods are proposed and/or used to mitigate the risks that
arise from the undesireable use of insecure passwords.
Some of the most prominent of these authentication protocols are presented below:
1. OpenID: OpenID [51] is a protocol supported by large organisations according
to the OpenID Foundation. Google, Microsoft, PayPal and Amazon are among
these organisations.
In OpenID architecture there is a ‘relying party’ (a website that wants to verify a
user identity) and an ‘OpenID provider’ (a website that provides authentication
services). The user creates an account with an OpenID provider - this account is
then used to authenticate the user. If the user wants to authenticate to a second
website that supports OpenID, she does not need an account with the second
website. Instead the user authenticates to the OpenID provider, who then trans-
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fers the authentication result to the relying party through the user’s browser.
How the OpenID provider authenticates the users is up to its website’s imple-
mentation, thus it may be a simple password or use of more advanced techniques
like smart cards or biometrics.
2. OAuth: OAuth is an authorisation standard [52]. OAuth allows a user to autho-
rise a website to access some of their information on another website, without
having to provide authentication credentials e.g. assuming that a user wants to
allow a website to access photos of the user posted/hosted on another website.
The user is called the ‘resource owner’, in the sense that they are the ultimate
entity that authorises access to her photos. The authorisation server (i.e. the
website containing this photos), allows the other website to access these pho-
tos, if the user specifically authorises it. For this purpose the requesting website
presents an access token/‘valet’ key to the authorisation server and gets access
to this information, without the user having to submit any credentials to the
requesting website.
It must be noted that OAuth is an authorisation and not an authentication
standard. However, in practice certain implementations are using OAuth as a
pseudo-authentication protocol, assuming that the user that provides the au-
thorisation has already authenticated with the authorisation server. The use of
an authorisation protocol for authentication is a security risk (as these are two
different attributes). This risk was dealt with OpenID Connect.
3. OpenID Connect: OpenID Connect [53] is an authentication layer that sits on
top of OAuth and adds authentication information to the authorisation informa-
tion. The protocol allows for third-parties to request and obtain authentication
information for a user, in addition to access to information that the user allows.
OpenID Connect thus combines both ‘worlds’ of OAuth and OpenID.
4. SAML: The Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) [54] is a protocol that
allows for authentication and authorisation information to be exchanged between
parties. It is XML-based and its specification is provided by the OASIS Security
Services Technical Committee.
SAML’s main use is for web browser single sign-on (SSO). The ‘principal’ (i.e.
the user), the ‘identity provider’ (IdP) and the ‘service provider’ (SP) are the
three main entities in the protocol. The user authenticates with the IdP and
presents the authentication result to the SP. This result is in the form an iden-
tity assertion - depending on the implementation this assertion may also contain
authorisation information and not only authentication. The SP can then accept
or reject the assertion and allow the user to access resources offered by the SP.
Usually between the SP and the IdP there is a pre-existing establishment of trust
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that occurs through the exchange of the necessary X.509 certificates.
The method of authentication is left to the implementation, i.e. it may be a
password, a biometric or multi-factor.
In reality, SAML is used exclusively for corporate applications. In this instance,
the organisation’s Active Directory or LDAP directory usually provides the iden-
tity and the service providers are web applications that the user is authorised to
use under a corporate identity. Usually an intermediary is used in the form of
a paid service like Okta or OneLogin that allows for easy and secure connection
between the identity provider and the service provider. This intermediary plays
the role of the identity provider.
The above authentication methods aim at facilitating the way that users authenticate
on the Web, but security problems still exist.
3.2.5 Phishing Attacks
One of the biggest threats on the Web is how users authenticate to web applications [55].
It is a reality for a large number of web users that they are required to remember and
maintain a large number of passwords, that have to be unique for each website. Addi-
tionally, these passwords have to be strong enough to avoid being guessed by attackers.
In practice, these good practices are followed only from a minority of users. The
vast majority are reusing passwords across multiple websites and the even biggest risk
is that many of them are not able to identify malicious, phishing emails. On top of
this, large hacks, like the ones that occured with Yahoo [56] leave users exposed even
when they are indeed following all proper security guidelines.
3.2.5.1 Phishing and Antiphishing Mechanisms
Phishing is the most prominent and simplest to implement method for attackers to
steal authentication credentials from users. Phishing is any attempt aiming at surrep-
titiously obtaining a user’s username and password credentials by tricking the user.
Attackers are using legitimate-looking (but under the attacker’s control) websites that
convince the user that the website is indeed legitimate. Once the user submits the
credentials, these are then received by the crook, who in turn is able to use them and
authenticate as the user.
To mitigate phishing attacks, the industry developed a number of solutions e.g. anti-
spoofing mechanisms are employed by all security aware companies/organisations, while
at the same time anti-impersonation tools aim at detecting phishing emails at the
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perimeter of the corporate networks (by using a number of parameters, like the time
that a certain domain is active, how similar is with the corporate domain, etc.). The dis-
advantage is that these solutions are for a corporate environment and not the end user
and even on corporate networks they are not always successful at mitigating the threat.
On the other hand, security awareness could be considered the most important security
solution againt phishing attacks. Instead of putting in place just technical solutions, a
security training tries to educate the end user to be able to detect potential phishing
attacks. However, there have been instances where even well trained and security-aware
users fell victims to a phishing attack [57].
Another mitigating technique comes in the form of a picture that the user chooses
upon registration. This picture must be shown on the login page and if it is not,
then the user will understand that the website is not legitimate (since the malicious
website will not know which is the correct image). Unfortunately, even with this solu-
tion, users are ready to submit their credentials, even if they do not see the login image.
The result is that users are constantly falling victim to phishing attacks.
A solution to the problem is to use what is called a second-factor of authentication, i.e.
apart from the username and password pair, the user is required to submit a second
value (usually a one time password, i.e. a password that is valid for a short period
only). This second factor comes in a variety of forms [11]. It may be an SMS with
a code, an application running on the phone that provides one-time passwords (e.g.
Google Authenticator) or a hardware token, e.g. a Yubikey. However, the former solu-
tion is no longer considered adequate as advised by the National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) [58]. Similarly the Yubikey is not widely supported at time of
writing and it also has a monetery value (as with all other hardware tokens). Google
Authenticator (and other similar solutions like Microsoft’s Authenticator) is a security
solution without known vulnerabilities so far, but it assumes that the user’s phone is
secure. Once an attacker gets hold of the phone, there is nothing to stop her from us-
ing Google Authenticator to authenticate to websites. Another important factor that
needs to be considered is that Google Authenticator runs on the insecure part of the
phone (Android OS) and there is no guarantee that there will not be attacks against
this application. Additionally, from a usability point of view, some users may find it
difficult to install the respective application and/or use it.
Apart from these authentication concerns, another big problem on the Web is the
security of e-commerce transactions.
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3.2.6 Credit/Debit Card Data Security Problems
With the big advancement of electronic commerce, the necessity for credit/debit card
use on the web became a reality. A customer must be able to pay in an easy and safe
way as it happens when in store. These transactions are called card-not-present (CNP),
as the physical card is not in proximity to the merchant’s Point of Sale (PoS) equipment
as opposed to card-present (CP) transactions where the actual card is presented and
used inside the shop. However, the biggest concern with CNP transactions is exactly
the fact that the merchant cannot confirm that the person that purchases the goods
is the real owner, whereas with CP transactions there are countermeasures. With the
EMV chip cards for example, a PIN is needed to authorise the purchase. These cards
also employ certain other security characteristics. Another example is the predecessor
to the EMV chip card where the retailer can check the purchasers identity by asking
for an identity card or a signature to match against the one on the reverse of the card.
For CNPs to be used in a more secure way, the card is delivered to the client with a
three digit code at the back of the card. This code is called Card Verification Value
(CVV). When the customer wishes to purchase something on the Internet, she will
be asked to provide that number. This provides some assurance to the merchant that
the buyer is indeed the real owner of the card or at least has the card in their possession.
In practice this has proven to be partially effective. A number of security breaches
resulted in the exposure of credit/debit card numbers with the CVVs that accompany
them. This practically means that the security that the CVV offers is compromised [59].
To combat the problem of credit card fraud, the leading credit card companies (in-
cluding Visa and MasterCard) created a security standard that must be followed by
anyone that processes credit/debit card data. The standard is the Payment Card In-
dustry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) [60]. PCI DSS is now in version 3.2, is a
reasonably developed standard and its effect is felt since it was initially launched.
The effect that PCI DSS has brought to the battle against credit/debit card fraud is
still questioned by a number of experts [13], while others keep a more positive stance.
However, what is generally agreed is the fact that compliance with PCI DSS is diffi-
cult and expensive to maintain. Becoming PCI DSS compliant assumes a significant
investment in IT infrastructure, process changes and human capital that may not be
affordable to every company.
Note: IoT/WoT security concerns will be mentioned in Chapter 7.
After the introduction of the areas that will be investigated in this thesis, we will
introduce the basic entity that we are going to use in order to tackle the security
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concerns in the above areas, the Smart Card Web Server.
3.3 Introduction to the Smart Card Web Server
The Smart Card Web Server (SCWS) is a tiny, stripped down HTTP web server, spe-
cially designed to operate in constrained environments as is a smart card. The basic
focus of the SCWS is to allow Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) the ability to offer
services over ‘web’ protocols.
The main purpose of the SCWS is to offer services to the user over the browser that
is running on the mobile device. Traditionally these types of services were offered by
the SIM toolkit, but the emergence of modern mobile devices, that can provide rich
content, rendered the SIM toolkit obsolete. Present day users are more demanding,
expecting graphics and extensive functionality that will exploit the power of modern
mobile devices.
At the same time, users are accustomed to the use of the Web its ability to deliver
services be delivered via a web browser is very important. The SCWS is able to of-
fer this as well, since it is a web entity, able to offer its content directly to a web browser.
The SCWS will be able to serve static, as well as dynamic content. Applications
register to the SCWS and are identified by a specific URL. When the user tries to
access such a URL, the SCWS triggers the application in question, which creates the
content and sends it back to the SCWS. The SCWS then sends the content to the user’s
browser. Such applications are content providing applications.
Before serving the content, the application can present an authentication form to the
user, which means that the SCWS can support content that needs a more advanced
level of authorisation in order to be accessed.
Another category of SCWS applications is one where they are registered as interception
applications. These applications exist passively on the SCWS meaning that they never
reply to requests. These applications are triggered before the content providing appli-
cations and are mainly used for purposes like logging. This thesis investigates the use of
content providing applications. For information about the SCWS, see [61] [62] [63] [64].
Modes of Operation
The SCWS is designed to operate in two modes:
1. In server mode
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2. In client mode
The SCWS is said to be operating in server mode when it answers to requests by a client
(e.g. browser running on the phone). This can be considered the ‘normal’ operation
for the SCWS. The client mode is when the SCWS is itself functioning as a client.
This is the case when the the MNO is remotely administering the SCWS (see below
the relevant section).
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 represent both modes of operation for the SCWS.
3.4 SCWS Uniform Resource Locator (URL)
The SCWS, as any other web server, will be accessed through traditional HTTP Uni-
form Resource Locator (URL) of at least 1024 characters.
3.5 Bearer Independent Protocol Transport Protocol
The Bearer Independent Protocol (BIP) as defined in [24], is used in the case where
the card cannot support direct access over HTTPS, i.e. does not implement a TCP/IP
stack. In this instance, all communication between the SCWS and the user’s browser
is happening using the BIP that encapsulates all HTTPS traffic. For the exchange of
information to occur properly, there must be a gateway on the phone that will act as
an intermediate between the browser and the SCWS.
The BIP gateway (as it is called) will receive HTTPS requests from the browser and
will encapsulate these requests in a packet and then will pass it over to the SCWS. The
SCWS will then strip the encapsulated packet and will retrieve the original request.
The reply will be done in the same way, but towards the opposite direction. Again the
BIP gateway will act as the intermediary and translator between the two.
The port numbers that are registered for this communication will be 3516 when com-
munication is over HTTP and 4116 when it is over HTTPS. Also, the IP address used
for the communication is the ‘loopback’ or localhost IP address of 127.0.0.1.
The specification also allows the SCWS to open multiple communication channels with
applications on the phone, meaning that the SCWS will be able to serve multiple
requests.
3.6 Using the TCP/IP Protocol
If the smart card supports a TCP/IP stack and is able to directly reply and serve
HTTPS requests from the phone’s browser, then there is no need for the BIP gate-
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way [25] and [26]. In this case, the port for HTTP communication will be the tradi-
tional 80 port, while the equivalent for HTTPS will be the 443. The IP address can be
dynamically allocated, but the specification mentions that the card must be addressed
by the name ‘localuicc’.
3.7 User or Principal Authentication to the SCWS
The specification requires that the SCWS must support Basic Authentication as defined
in IETF RFC 2617 [50] and may also support Digest Access Authentication. However,
the triggered application can implement its own authentication scheme (as mentioned
above), for example an application specific user name and password or a PIN. This
functionality is being used throughout this thesis.
3.8 Transport Layer Security (TLS)
The SCWS must support both ways for TLS communication. Thus, it must support
symmetric encryption using PSK-TLS where the communication between the SCWS
and any outside entity will be protected through the use of a pre-shared key. The
specification requires the use of modern symmetric algorithms, i.e. AES or 3DES.
It must also support asymmetric encryption through the use of public key cryptog-
raphy and certificates. The specifications requires the use of RSA as a minimum.
3.9 Access Control Policy
The specification also defines another security feature that will protect the SCWS from
unauthorised access from applications that run on the phone. It is called Access Con-
trol Policy Enforcer and will control which applications have the right to access the
SCWS or not. This is particularly important because with current technology, users
are allowed to download and install applications on their phones. Some of them may
be malicious, so the SCWS must be properly protected from being accessed by rogue
applications.
The Enforcer will allow only certain trusted applications to access the SCWS. These
applications may be applications provided by the MNO, the handset manufacturer, that
are identified by a proper certificate or some other enterprise trust (maybe applications
that run inside a trusted environment as provided by Mobile Device Management so-
lutions). The specification mentions that this Access Control Policy will be provided
to the Enforcer by the smart card over HTTP.
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3.10 Remote Administration
As mentioned above, the SCWS will not only act as a server replying to client requests,
but will also function in a client mode when the MNO wishes to administer the SCWS.
This may happen in cases where the MNO wants to upload new data e.g. a photo or
a new xHTML page, delete data or change configuration parameters.
When the Remote Administration Server wants to start an administrative session,
it first sends a Push message to the SCWS administration agent. This message can
be through either a normal Short Message Service (SMS) or the Open Mobile Alliance
(OMA) Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Push Enabler. Upon receipt of the adminis-
tration message, the administration agent initiates the administration session.
There may be certain pages and URLs that will be accessible only to the adminis-
tration entity (e.g. /SCWS/admin), which means that unauthorised entities will not
be able to alter information on the SCWS.
The administration commands are as follows:
1. PUT (is used to install or update a page)
2. DELETE (is used to delete a page)
3. POST (is used to send administration commands to the SCWS)
4. GET (is used when the remote administration entity wishes to retrieve a page or
audit the SCWS)
5. HEAD (is used to retrieve the header of a page)
3.11 Administration Protocols
The specification defines two different types of administration methods:
3.11.1 Lightweight Administration Protocol
When the administrator wishes to change a small amount of parameters, then the most
appropriate way to administer the SCWS is through the use of the Lightweight Ad-
ministration Protocol.
This protocol uses current Over-The-Air (OTA) protocols and the commands are de-
livered through SMS messages.
3.11.2 Full Administration Protocol
When the administrator wishes to make a larger number of changes on the SCWS, then
the Lightweight Protocol is not appropriate. In this instance, the Full Administration
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Protocol (FAP) must be used. This is the case when pages or a page need(s) to be
uploaded to the SCWS or a large number of configuration changes must occur or data
must be exchanged with applications residing on the SCWS,e.g. a large image needs
to be uploaded on the SCWS.
The full administration protocol is happening over TCP/IP (and eventually over BIP
if the card does not natively support TCP/IP) and TLS (for security) and assumes the
use of an on-card entity, called the Card Administration Agent.
Card Administration Agent
The Card Administration Agent is an HTTP/1.1 client that acts as the intermediate
between the Remote Administration Server and the SCWS.
It manages connection establishment between the Remote Administration Server and
the SCWS, retries and reconnects when a connection drops and can be triggered either
by external events (communication starting from the Remote Administration Server)
or from internal events generated by the card.
Full administration over BIP
When the card cannot support direct communication over TCP/IP, then the card
administration agent will communicate with the BIP gateway over BIP commands [24].
Full administration over TCP/IP
If the smart card implements a TCP/IP stack and can communicate natively over
TCP/IP, then the card administration agent does not need to encapsulate TCP/IP
traffic in BIP commands and can contact directly the remote administration server
without the need for the BIP gateway.
It must be noted, that the Remote Administration Server can trigger an adminis-
tration session either through an SMS sent to the agent or through on OMA SIP Push
message.
3.12 User Self-Care Administration
The specification includes a mention that the SCWS may provide the necessary capa-
bility to the end user, for the latter to update her password. As mentioned above, this
is an expected functionality, in case there is protected content that the SCWS will have
to serve to the end user.
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3.13 Conclusion of the Chapter
In this chapter we offered an overview of the Web and some of the major threats
that the Web is facing. These threats are the ones that in the next chapters we will
try to mitigate through the use of the SCWS. The latter entity, was also described,
since the reader should understand the main SCWS components before proceeding to
the solutions represented later. The first of these solutions will be outlined in the next
chapter. The feasibility of using the SCWS as a mitigating factor against DDoS attacks
will be described. The solution aims at making extremely difficult and expensive any
DDoS attack that can be launched against a voting infrastructure, by distributing the
functionality to ‘miniature’ voting websites that are hosted on the local SCWS for each
of the voters.
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This chapter is based on the papers Distributed E-Voting Using the Smart Card Web
Server, 7th International Conference on Risks and Security of Internet and Systems
(CRiSIS 2012), Cork, Ireland, October 2012 and Remote E-Voting Using the Smart
Card Web Server, CRiSIS 2012 special edition of International Journal of Secure Soft-
ware Engineering (IJSSE), Vol.5(1), IGI Global, 2014.
In the previous chapter we described the main components of the Web and the SCWS,
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before proceeding in this chapter to present the novel idea of using the SCWS as a means
to support a distributed way of conducting elections. This solution allow the mitigation
of fears of DDoS attacks against voting websites that aim at disabling or disrupting the
voting procedure. The solution is using secure, standardised, well-established protocols
like HTTPS. The description considers a voting scheme, named Preˆt a` Voter, which is
a solution in the e-voting field. In this chapter, we will explain how we can use this
scheme with a Smart Card Web Server. A security analysis will also be presented,
before concluding the chapter.
4.1 Introduction
Voting in elections is a fundamental democratic right, but it can be a challenge to engage
citizens and encourage them to vote. Public engagement with the democratic process
could be improved by using remote e-voting systems, where a voter uses their own
computer or mobile device to cast votes over the Internet. Examples of practical im-
plementations of remote e-voting include elections in Estonia [65] and Switzerland [66].
The fundamental requirements for any voting system are that votes should be recorded
as cast, counted as recorded and not linked to a specific voter. Only eligible voters
should be allowed to vote, and they can only cast one vote each [67]. Some e-voting
systems are designed to address these requirements in the controlled environment of
an election poll-site. Examples include fully electronic systems such as Votebox [68],
Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) machines [69, 70], and paper-based ballots such as
Preˆt a` Voter [71] and the Scratch Card voting system [72].
Remote e-voting systems, however, have to operate in unsupervised environments, lead-
ing to opportunities for denial of service and technical attacks on the voting infrastruc-
ture. For example, the voter’s equipment could be infected with malware that tampers
with the vote, or a Voting Authority (VA)’s centralised web servers could be attacked,
as seen in the 2010 Washington D.C. election [73] and the 2012 Canadian New Demo-
cratic Party Elections [74]. These attacks can seriously undermine the credibility of
an election. In the Washington D.C. case, the e-voting system was broken into within
48 hours of it becoming available, and by taking control of the election server, the
attackers ‘changed every vote and revealed almost every secret ballot’ [73]. Coercion
and vote-buying are also problems for remote e-voting. Anti-coercion measures are
included in some e-voting systems e.g. Civitas [75], but some schemes are specifically
designed for use in low-coercion elections, such as Helios [76].
Although many e-voting processes can be cryptographically protected to ensure the
integrity and confidentiality of the votes cast, Rivest [77] identified a critical problem
with remote implementations, i.e. ‘interfacing the voter to the cryptography’. Security
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weaknesses in hardware, operating systems and software mean that equipment cannot
be trusted. This is known as ‘the secure platform problem’. Several methods to address
this have been proposed [78]. One approach is code voting, when voting authorisation
codes are sent to voters before the election, via a second channel such as the postal
service: see [72, 79, 80, 81] for examples.
Two methods could be used to make attacking a remote e-voting system less attrac-
tive. Firstly, installing vote processing in a trusted tamper resistant environment that
can only be accessed by authorised parties will reduce the opportunity for malicious
modifications to the voting application. Secondly, distributing vote processing over a
large number of web servers will mean that an attacker must target multiple sites to be
successful. The most ubiquitous tamper resistant security token available is the mobile
phone SIM card [17]. A SIM equipped with a SCWS, has web server functionality in
the SIM environment, so a distributed vote processing application can therefore be run
in a tamper resistant environment.
A mobile phone SIM is a restricted processing platform, however, so a voting applica-
tion cannot necessarily perform all required e-voting system functions. It can provide
a ‘front end’ input method to more sophisticated cryptographic e-voting systems which
do have the required resources. This chapter proposes a generic SCWS-based voting
procedure that can be used with existing e-voting systems to provide a complete voting
solution. As an example, the SCWS approach will be shown with the e-voting system
Preˆt a` Voter (PAV) [67], as this scheme has features which can be readily adapted to
work on a phone.
This chapter acknowledges the problems caused by coercion and vote buying in re-
mote e-voting, but does not attempt to offer a solution. The purpose of the proposal is
to minimise the potential for web server based attacks on an e-voting system by mov-
ing this processing to the tamper resistant SIM, whilst relying on the MNO’s trusted
SCWS administration protocols to transport the votes to the VA. The chapter is struc-
tured as follows: notation used is shown in Table 4.2. A generic model for using the
SCWS in a voting system is presented in Section 4.2. The e-voting system, Preˆt a`
Voter, is briefly described in Section 4.3, before being used as an example with the
SCWS generic model in Section 4.4 to provide a complete remote e-voting system. A
preliminary security analysis of the proposal is presented in Section 4.5. The Scyther
tool is presented in Section 4.6 and the formal analysis of the protocol that it provides
in Section 4.7, before the chapter concludes in Section 4.8.
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Table 4.1: Security Credentials
Credential Description Location
Voter ID Size and complexity according to VA’s policies - it is better to avoid having a
voter ID similar to the voter’s surname or other demographic information, so
that it will be more difficult for an attacker to guess.
Stored on the SIM. Known by
voter and VA.
Password Size and complexity according to best practices [82] - has to be at least 8 char-
acters long with upper/lowercase letters, at least a number and a punctuation
character.
Stored on the SIM. Known by
voter and VA.
Key Pair (pub-
lic/private)
A cryptographic key pair (PUBV , PKV ) used for encryption/decryption, sign-
ing/verifying - for key separation purposes, it is better to have a different key
pair for encryption and another one for digitally signing (but this depends
on the VA). The key size should be according to best practices (see NIST
SP800-57 Part1 [83] for details).
Private key stored on the SIM
alone. Public key also known
to the VA.
Public Key (VA) PUBV A will be used to encrypt data sent to VA by the SCWS (e.g. the vote).
It is best practice to use a different key for every election, so that brute force
attacks against it (if successful) only affect one election .
Stored on the SIM and known
to everybody
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4.2 Generic Model for E-Voting Using SCWS
4.2.1 Entities and Assumptions
The entities involved in the proposed generic e-voting system are as follows:
• Voting Authority (VA): The VA has details of all voter credentials, candidate
information, ballot forms and election parameters. It is responsible for creating
the voting application, registering voters, and receiving and counting the votes
once they have been cast.
• Smart Card Web Server (SCWS): as described previously.
• Remote Administration Server: This is the interface between the e-voting system
and the voter’s mobile SCWS. It updates the SCWS of a voter’s registered phone
via the MNO’s Full Administration Protocol, using HTTPS.
• Mobile Network Operator (MNO): The MNO provides management services such
as Lightweight and Full Administration Protocols to update the SCWS on the
SIM, and a mobile network infrastructure.
• Voting Application: Installed on the SCWS (as described in [33]), this displays
ballot forms and collects votes ready for transfer to the VA.
• Mobile Phone and Browser: The mobile phone handset and browser application
are generally untrusted, as ‘jail-broken’ operating systems or malware can com-
promise the correct operation of the phone’s applications and operating system.
It is assumed that:
• For the purposes of the proposed design, the mobile phone has a one-to-one
mapping to the voter, allowing just one vote per SCWS.
• The VA must be trusted not to collude with the MNO, as the MNO only pro-
vides management procedures and infrastructure and should not be trusted with
sensitive voter, ballot form or election information.
• A secure voter registration procedure is in place. The exact details are out of the
scope of this chapter, but a voter must supply a mobile phone number to the VA
for e-voting via a phone. It is assumed that voter credentials (voter ID/password)
will be generated in a secure way, along with a voter public/private cryptographic
key pair (PUBV , PKV ) to be used in the voting process. The public key of the
VA PUBV A will also be required: the security credentials which are assumed to
be available following registration are shown in Table 4.1.
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Table 4.2: E-Voting Notation
Notation Description
PUBV A Public Key of the Voting Authority
PUBV Public (Encryption) Key of the Voter
PKV Private (Decryption) Key of the Voter
4.2.2 Installation of Application onto SCWS
The data shown in Table 4.1 is sent to the voter’s SCWS by the remote administration
server, using the Full Administration Protocol. Firstly, (PUBV ,PKV ) and PUBV A
are sent to the SCWS. After this procedure has completed successfully, the voter ID /
password and application (code/data) are transferred in the same way, encrypted by
PUBV for decryption on the SIM using PKV . The communication channel in both
occasions is protected by HTTPS. This is shown as messages 1 and 2 in the protocol
diagram in Figure 4.3.
The voting application (a Java servlet running on the SCWS) must be given access to
the voter credentials and the keys installed on the SIM, and is able to create dynamic
content [61]. The application creates this content whenever requested and returns it
back to the SCWS (which in turns serves this content to the voter as HTML pages).
The voter may be notified about the installation, for example via an SMS, an auto-
matic call (such as an Interactive Voice Response (IVR)), an e-mail to a pre-registered
e-mail address or by simply updating the SCWS home page with a link pointing to the
voting site inside the SIM card. This is shown as message 3 in the protocol diagram in
Figure 4.3.
Note: it is generally considered a better practice to avoid transmitting private keys.
Keeping these keys secure in a tamper resistant environment where they were already
created, means that these keys remain reasonably secure for their entire life time. For
a private key to be transferred from the location of its creation to another location,
there must exist at least three main conditions (among others):
• The sender and the recipient must have absolute trust in each other.
• The recipient must offer at least the same level of security as the one that the
sender can offer.
• The communication channel is at least as secure as the information that has to
pass through it.
It is expected that all above conditions will be met. However, to avoid going through
this whole process, the Voting Authority can have already in place a mechanism to
provide SIM cards with pre-installed public/private key-pairs or to allow them to be
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created on the SIM as per request. In this thesis we are not going to consider such
option and we will assume that the whole process mets at least the above three criteria.
4.2.3 Authentication
The VA will again contact the voter through an SMS, IVR call or e-mail when the elec-
tion starts, and the SCWS homepage will show a ‘VOTE NOW’ link . Clicking the link
transfers the voter to the SCWS environment and an authentication page is displayed.
In this page the voter will enter the voter ID/password that were issued during the
electoral registration. The voter ID/password are checked against the ones that were
previously transferred to the SIM card, and that the voter ID has not been used to
vote already. If the authentication is successful, the voter is presented with the ballot
form, in a format determined by the e-voting system used. Again the communication
takes place over HTTPs, shown in messages 4 to 7 in Figure 4.3.
4.2.4 Choosing a Candidate
On the ballot form, next to each candidate there is a radio button that the voter has to
check in order for the candidate to be chosen. Once the choice has been made, selecting
a ‘VOTE’ button generates the next screen, asking for confirmation of the candidate
chosen (it is possible to include a text entry option for code voting schemes). Once
the voter confirms, the vote is submitted to the SCWS. These are messages 8 to 11 in
the protocol diagram in Figure 4.3, and again all communication is over HTTPS. At
this stage it is possible to include a dummy vote (if the e-voting system allows this for
verification purposes, e.g. in [84]).
4.2.5 Vote Storage and Sending
The vote is now stored on the SIM card. The format of the vote is dependent on the
voting scheme used: for example, it could be a pre-assigned vote code as in [79], or
a cryptogram which determines the position of the candidates on the ballot form as
in [67]. The vote is encrypted with PUBV A, and this will be retrieved by the VA and
subsequently deleted from the SCWS after it is cast. The vote is also kept on the SIM
for future reference, encrypted with PUBV . This encryption is not strictly necessary,
but is included to provide an additional security measure in case space restrictions
mean the vote is stored in non-tamper resistant memory or on the phone. A flag is set
to indicate that the voter ID has been used to vote. Once the vote is encrypted, the
SCWS administration agent will either trigger a connection with the remote server, or
the remote server can automatically retrieve the vote on a specific day/time. In both
cases the two entities initiate a HTTPS connection and the remote server retrieves the
vote through the use of the Full Administration Protocol. Once the vote is received by
the VA, the voter receives a notification that their vote was cast via a second channel
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Alice
Charlie X 3672
Bob
Name Vote Code Vote Code
Figure 4.1: Preˆt a` Voter Ballot Forms Before and After Voting
e.g. an SMS message, a voice message or an email. Steps 12 to 15 in Figure 4.3 show
the vote storage and sending process.
We now turn our attention to Preˆt a` Voter, an example of an e-voting system which
could be used with the generic model of SCWS vote processing.
4.3 The Preˆt a` Voter E-Voting System
Preˆt a` Voter (PAV) [67, 84, 85, 86] is a paper-based e-voting system designed for the
supervised environment of an election polling-station. The paper ballot form is used as
input to a cryptographic system. The electoral process can be audited by voters and
third parties, to give end-to-end verifiability. Voters can verify the system by perform-
ing dummy votes, which are not included in the final election count.
Voters are given a paper ballot form, and they mark their choice with an X. Every
ballot form is different, as candidates are listed in a (different) random order on each
one. There is a code (called an ‘onion’) which contains details of the candidate order
in encrypted form. When the vote is cast, the left hand side of the form (containing
the candidate names) is detached and destroyed, leaving the voter with a voting slip
showing the position of their vote on the form, but not who the chosen candidate was.
65
4.4 Using the SCWS With Preˆt a` Voter
This is input to the PAV system and the voter is given the slip as a receipt which can
be checked against a web bulletin board at a later stage. The actual vote recorded in
the system is the numerical position of the voter’s choice and the onion i.e. (index,
onion).
In the PAV scheme, ballot forms can be printed on demand by the voting booth,
as described in [85]. Briefly, two related onions are calculated for each ballot form, the
‘booth’ onion (left onion) encrypted with the public key of the voting booth, and the
‘registrar onion’ (right onion) encrypted in the normal PAV way. These ‘proto-ballot’
forms can be distributed and stored securely prior to the election. Alternatively, the
left onion could be encrypted with PUBV (rather than a booth key) without losing
any security, by using ElGamal for distributed blinding as described in [87]. On elec-
tion day, when a voter takes a ballot form into the voting booth, the booth reads the
left onion, uses its previously stored secret key to decrypt the onion, reconstructs the
candidate list and prints the ballot form. The vote is cast using the right onion, i.e.
(index, right onion).
In [86], confirmation codes for each candidate are printed on the ballot form. These
codes are calculated by the voting authority prior to the election. Once a voter has cast
their vote, the confirmation codes are recalculated by the voting authority and relayed
back to the voter at the poll-site. The voter can check this received value against a
confirmation code hidden on the ballot form under a scratch-off strip, which only they
should see. The voter’s receipt contains the position (index) of their chosen candidate,
the associated confirmation code and the right onion. Figure 4.1 shows ballot forms
with confirmation codes, before and after voting.
It is the ability to print ballot forms on demand, along with the use of confirma-
tion codes that make Preˆt a` Voter a suitable example e-voting system to use with the
SCWS model. The next section describes how this will work.
4.4 Using the SCWS With Preˆt a` Voter
The advantage of using Preˆt a` Voter with confirmation codes is that most of the cryp-
tography (i.e. generating the onions) is done by the VA before the election starts, so
this minimises the amount of cryptographic processing necessary in the restricted en-
vironment of the SIM. With suitable modifications to the generic model, the SCWS
voting application can play the part of the PAV voting booth, to decrypt the candidate
ordering and hence display ballot forms. The SCWS can also store confirmation codes
securely so that when the voter receives a code from the VA (in an SMS) the two values
can be compared. Figure 4.2 shows an overview of the design.
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Figure 4.2: Preˆt a` Voter and SCWS
In message 2 of the protocol shown in Figure 4.3, PAV candidate lists and ‘proto-ballots’
(including confirmation codes) are sent to the SCWS along with the voting application
and other credentials. The left onion must be encrypted with PUBV , using the El-
Gamal blinding technique mentioned earlier. It is suggested that several proto-ballots
are sent, as this allows the voter to cast dummy votes to audit the system if they so
desire. The authentication stage remains the same as the generic SCWS approach, but
when the ballot form is to be displayed (message 7 in Figure 4.3), the PAV method of
constructing the candidate order must be followed. This involves decrypting the left
onion using ElGamal and PKV , and then reconstructing the candidate order using a
predetermined PAV procedure [84, 85]. The ballot form can then be displayed.
Choosing the candidate and voting is the same as in the generic SCWS approach.
Once the candidate has been chosen, the vote needs to be signed with the voter’s
signing key before it is retrieved by the remote administration server. As the added
precaution mentioned previously, a copy of the vote with its associated confirmation
code is encrypted with PUBV and stored on the SCWS. Storing the confirmation code
on the SCWS ensures that at a later stage, only the voter can see this code (as specified
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Figure 4.3: SCWS Voting Protocol
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Table 4.3: OWASP Vulnerabilities and Defences
OWASP Top Ten
Reference
Is it relevant
to SCWS?
Defences
A1 Injection Yes Traditional injection attacks such SQL or LDAP (Lightweight Directory Access Protocol)
do not apply here. However injection attacks targeting the login page where the input
fields are located can occur. Strict filtering of input to this page will be needed.
A2 Broken Authen-
tication and Session
Management
Yes All credentials are encrypted and stored inside the SIM card where it is very difficult for
them to be retrieved. Additionally, all credentials go through secure TLS connections
while in transit and there is no account creation/password changing directly on the SIM.
If an attacker were to gain possession of the credentials, they are useless anywhere except
on the phone where they are stored. So the attacker has to be in possession of the phone or
manage to access the SCWS remotely (although according to the specification the SCWS
is not designed for such remote access)
A3 Cross-site Script-
ing (XSS)
Yes The only input fields that the attacker can use are in the login page. Strict filtering of
input to this page will be needed.
A4 Insecure Direct
Object References
Yes Assuming that the applications on the SCWS may have different users accessing the same
application or different levels of access (admin vs regular/standard user), this attack defi-
nitely applies and proper authorisation and verification of all access requests should exist.
A5 Security Miscon-
figuration
No This attack does not apply to the SIM environment, as it is expected that the SCWS
will be properly configured and patched by the MNO. In general, this threat exists when
systems that work with a web server (databases, operating systems, etc.) may be left
unpatched and insecure.
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OWASP Top Ten
Reference
Is it relevant
to SCWS?
Defences
A6 Sensitive Data
Exposure
No It is expected that the tamper resistance of the SIM card and the use of secure com-
munication channels, will protect data in transit and in rest. All sensitive data (votes)
will be encrypted, as an added precaution in case storage space limitations give rise to a
requirement to store them in a non-tamper resistant memory location, or on the phone.
Any access to the cryptographic keys could be protected by a PIN (or not given at all),
and the tamper resistance capabilities of the SIM should resist physical attacks. All com-
munication will occur over HTTPS (VA to agent, browser to SCWS) and all certificates
are valid.
A7 Missing Function
Level Access Control
Yes Considering the fact that the SCWS will host applications that offer different levels of
access, proper authorisation functions must exist in each.
A8 Cross-Site
Request Forgery
(CSRF)
Yes This attack possibly applies to the SCWS environment, as a malicious user can use a CSRF
attack to access a session that the legitimate user may already have with the SCWS.
A9 Using Known
Vulnerable Compo-
nents
No As with A5 it is expected that all SCWS components will be properly patched and secure.
Another factor that provides mitigation against this type of attack, is that it will be very
difficult for a potential attacker to identify such vulnerabilities, as the SCWS will not by
publicly accessible.
A10 Unvalidated
Redirects and For-
wards
Yes This attack has the potential of being launched against the SCWS, e.g. if an application
forwards the user to another webpage, when this webpage is or can be provided or manip-
ulated by the user (which also means that an attacker can use this attack to redirect the
user to some malicious website) by providing a GET parameter that is used by the web
application to identify the redirect location. Safe redirects, as per web development best
practices, must be used to mitigate such attacks.
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in PAV). Finally, a flag should be set to indicate that the voter has voted.
The remote administration server passes the signed vote (unchanged) to the VA, tagged
with a temporary ID so that the vote receiving process at the VA does not find out
the mobile number, as this could be used to link the voter to a particular vote. Once
the VA has received the vote, checked its validity, and posted it to the bulletin board,
it will recalculate the confirmation code for the chosen candidate, and send it and the
temporary ID to the remote administration server. The confirmation code can then be
returned to the voter via SMS, for checking against the one stored on the SCWS. This
provides assurance that their vote was counted as cast because the correct confirma-
tion code can only be generated at the VA once it has been successfully decrypted and
matched to a valid entry in the bulletin board. A dummy vote process would obtain all
the confirmation codes for all the candidates via SMS: the dummy ballot form would
then be discarded, and a new one selected in its place.
The verification procedures of PAV gives the voter the assurance that their vote has
been cast as intended, and counted as cast. Using the SCWS model keeps all sensitive
vote information private in a tamper resistant environment, so that no one can deter-
mine how a voter voted.
The next section now provides a preliminary analysis of the security of the proposal.
4.5 Security Analysis
4.5.1 Web Server Security
To analyse the security of the e-voting solution, it is necessary to consider the main
characteristics of the overall approach and how it deals with attacks and risks, especially
those which target web applications. The Open Web Application Security Project
(OWASP) [88] issues a document which includes the Top Ten vulnerabilities that affect
the security of web applications, and as the SCWS will serve web content to clients on
the phone, it faces the same challenges and considerations as traditional web servers.
However, most of these identified vulnerabilities will not affect the security of the
proposed solution because the attack surface of the SCWS is small, and the code/data
used by the application is held inside a secure token. Table 4.3 shows the Top Ten
vulnerabilities, whether they are relevant to the security of the voting site stored on
the SCWS and how the proposal defends against them.
In contrast, traditional remote e-voting schemes have faced many of the common inter-
net application problems such as DoS attacks [74] and SQL injections [73]. Additionally,
‘secure platform’ [77] issues arise because the voter’s equipment cannot be trusted to
perform as expected either through malware or system vulnerabilities.
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Table 4.4: E-Voting Attacks and Defences
Attack Goal Method Defences
Find out contents of
vote, or how a voter
voted
Retrieve vote from
SCWS
Two copies of the vote are stored inside the SIM card, one encrypted using PUBV and
the other by PUBV A (this is deleted once the vote is cast). So the vote is always held
encrypted in the secure token and inaccessible to an attacker. The SCWS can only be
accessed from the handset’s HTTP client and the remote administration server, thereby
minimizing the likelihood of attacks that occur remotely. An attacker would need to know
the voter’s credentials in order to access the SCWS voting site.
Change contents of vote Tamper with data in
transit
The vote in transit is protected by the security of HTTPS for all communication channels.
Tampering by the
browser
By using the PAV system, any type of tampering with the vote can be detected by the
use of confirmation codes and a Bulletin Board where the voter may check their vote was
included as cast.
Prevent voter from vot-
ing
Denial of Service at-
tack
Distributing the voting application to the SCWS makes the system resilient to centralised
web server attacks.
Steal the phone There will need to be procedures in place to allow poll-site voting for those whose handsets
are lost/stolen/malfunctioning.
Suppress the vote:
do not send it to VA
from the SCWS
This attack is very difficult to launch successfully, as it needs to target individual phone
handsets. Using an SMS message to send a confirmation code back to the voter will give
assurance that their vote has indeed been retrieved and sent to the voting authority. If
no SMS is received then the voter can raise a query with the VA, and use an alternative
method to vote.
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Vote more than once Create fake voters
IDs
This will be handled by the registration procedure and is out of scope of this chapter.
Vote on several
phones
A voter’s credentials (voter ID/password) are installed directly onto the SCWS via the
MNO Full Administration Protocol. The credentials can only be used to access one par-
ticular SCWS: if an attacker found out a voter ID/password, e.g. through coercion, they
would not work with a different SCWS as they would not be recognised. Also, the VA
must have back office procedures to make sure that a voter ID is not used to vote more
than once.
Vote multiple times
on one phone
If an attacker obtains multiple voter ID/passwords, they cannot be used to vote on a
single handset, as the application on the SCWS will only recognise the registered voter’s
credentials. If the attacker has gained access to the registered voter’s ID/password during
the voting process, the credentials could not be used to vote on the same phone again, as
the ballot form will only be displayed when a voter ID has not been used before.
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4.5.2 Smart Card Web Server Security
The main security characteristics of using a SCWS based voting solution are as follows:
1. There is no centralised voting server to be attacked, hence a single point of failure
has been removed. DDoS attacks cannot easily take place because the voting
procedure is dispersed among many voters. Each voter effectively has a voting
server on their SIM, so for an attack to have a significant outcome, the attacker
has to infiltrate a large number of phones and find a way to orchestrate an attack
against them. A potential attacker must also find out which phones are registered
for voting in order to target them.
2. The SCWS remote administration server could be considered a single point of fail-
ure, but the important fact here is that this server may have restricted functions
and access to it is controlled. It runs on the Trusted Third Party (TTP)/MNO
premises, so should be isolated from any unauthorised physical access. However,
although internal threats cannot be ignored, within the scope of this proposal
it is assumed that the MNO is trusted to provide both the infrastructure and
management procedures securely.
3. The SCWS, the voting site and the credentials will be stored in a secure token, the
SIM card. The SIM has tamper resistant capabilities which can offer defences to
mitigate against physical and side channel attacks. Even if an attacker manages
to circumvent the considerable defences that the SIM presents they will only gain
access to one voter’s credentials. The voting application code will be stored in
the SIM, thus the attacker will need advanced knowledge and significant effort
to gain access to it. Again, the attacker would have to target a large number of
phones and their SCWS/SIMs to be effective.
4. The entire communication takes place over standard secure communication chan-
nels, protected by the HTTPS protocol. As mentioned in point 3, the voter’s
credentials and the rest of the important components of the scheme are securely
stored in a tamper resistant token. Thus the integrity of the entire scheme can
be reasonably assured.
4.5.3 E-Voting Security Issues
Voting systems must ensure that votes are: cast as the voter intended; recorded as
cast; counted as recorded; and not linkable to a specific vote. Also, no one should
be able to determine how a voter voted. An attacker can have many goals, including
manipulating the votes randomly, denying access to the voting procedure for legitimate
voters, adding votes for a specific candidate/party (ballot stuffing), spoiling votes for a
particular candidate or gaining knowledge about a voter’s choice of candidate. By its
nature, remote voting is vulnerable to coercion and vote buying, where a voter votes
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(willingly or unwillingly) as instructed by a third party. Coercion is a generic problem
which is not solved by the proposal in this chapter: other remote e-voting approaches
may be better suited to high-coercion scenarios. Table 4.4 shows a summary which
demonstrates how the proposed system deals with the most relevant attacks against its
security requirements.
There are many areas which could benefit from further research, some of which are
outlined in Chapter 8.
We believe that our solution can be used for additional purposes as well and e-voting
is only one use case that will help us explain the whole concept and feasibility.
4.5.4 Our Solution Against DDoS Attacks
The distributed nature of our proposal can be a new approach for the protection against
DDoS attacks that get bigger and bigger. Mitigating these attacks can be very expen-
sive, but in some scenarios it may not even be feasible. This protection can be applied
to cases like banking or other critical applications where downtime is impossible to
tolerate. People must be able to conduct banking even when the site is oﬄine. The
claim that a bank cannot go oﬄine is not valid as it is very difficult to maintain 100
per cent security or availability. Specifically for the use case presented in this thesis,
there have been instances of attacks against voting websites, e.g. against the Canadian
New Democratic Party Elections in 2012, while the 2016 US presidential elections were
full of articles of potential DDoS attacks during the elections. These attacks did not
materialise, but DDoS attacks are now part of the electoral discussions. Our approach
removes the necessity for a single point of failure. A voting website will not be served
from a specific location only, but rather the voting procedure will be distributed across
a large number of mini-sites.
4.6 Scyther Tool
The protocol described in this chapter was analysed by a verification tool called Scyther
[89]. Scyther is a tool used for the verification, falsification, and analysis of security
protocols. It is an open-source tool and it is very fast compared to other solutions.
More information on the Scyther tool can be found in [90] and information on the ver-
ification algorithm in [91]. Scyther takes a protocol as input and evaluates its ‘security
claims’, i.e. its security properties (e.g. a secret value) and outputs information on
certain attacks against the protocol and its claims. Scyther was used in this thesis (as
opposed to other protocols) based on the fact that it is faster than most of the other
protocols, that its installation is very easy compared to e.g. Casper and it has a smaller
learning curve. There are also examples available and in general the tool is quite well
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documented and fairly easy to use, without compromising on the correctness of the
results that it provides. A comparison of the efficiency of the various verification tools
can be found in [92]. It must be noted that Scyther was used to find vulnerabilities in
the ISO/IEC 9798-2 Entity Authentication standard [93]. This resulted in an updated
version of the protocol. Scyther was also used to identify weaknesses and to suggest
improvements on ISO/IEC 11770 [94]. Finally, all examples in this thesis were peer
reviewed for correctness.
4.7 Formal Analysis of the Protocol
In Figure 4.4 we present the results of the formal/verification analysis of the protocol
discussed in this chapter - the code can be found in Appendix A. The figure describes
the basic entities that participate in the protocol (RAS and SIM card, i.e. SCWS),
presents their claims and if there are attacks against any of these claims. If there was
an attack found, it would have been mentioned here and the user would be able to see
the attack by clicking on a button. As shown in the figure, the Scyther tool did not
find any attacks on our protocol as shown by status ‘OK’ (either values being secret or
messages being exchanged).
4.8 Conclusion of the Chapter
This chapter has presented a method for using a phone equipped with a Smart Card
Web Server SIM as a secure voter interface for e-voting, using the Preˆt a` Voter scheme
as an example. Distributing web server functionality to voters’ SIM cards means that
there is no central web server to target, and so an attacker must compromise many
phones to successfully affect the election result. The use of the SIM’s tamper resistant
environment for the storage and processing of sensitive voter credentials also addresses
the secure platform problem.
In the next chapter, we will present the idea of using the SCWS to secure card-not-
present transactions on the Web. The SCWS and the SIM card can be used during the
checkout process of an e-commerce transaction. The benefit is for the user to not hav-
ing to submit any cardholder data to the merchant and for the merchant to not having
to store any of these data, thus minimising the PCI DSS compliance requirements.
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Figure 4.4: E-Voting Protocol Formal Analysis (1/1)
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This chapter is based on the paper Card-Present transactions on the Internet Using the
Smart Card Web Server, 12th International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy
in Computing and Communications (TrustCom 2013), Melbourne, Australia.
In the previous chapter we presented a novel way to allow the distribution of a service
(e-voting), in order to avoid DDoS attacks and to disperse the execution of such appli-
cation, across multiple phones. We took advantage of the secure execution environment
of the SIM card that is able to protect all necessary secrets required for the conduct
of an important process like e-voting. In this chapter we will see, how we can use the
same approach to secure payments and transactions on the Web. The idea is to allow
the user to proceed with a payment in a card-not-present environment, such as on the
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Web, by actively requesting her to be in possession of a SIM card that contains the
card number and is able to participate in the transaction or to have the actual card.
This is achieved by the use of redirections between the e-commerce site and the SCWS
that is found inside the SIM card. Eventually, the card-not-present transactions are
transformed into card-present ones.
5.1 Introduction
In many countries the Internet is considered a necessity and access is almost ubiqui-
tous [95] [96]. People enjoy access to the rich content and services that the Internet
offers, when at work, at home and increasingly when on the move through the use of
smartphones and other portable devices like tablets. Purchasing over the Internet is
also increasing in popularity [97], both on traditional computing and on mobile plat-
forms. Merchants typically operate e-commerce websites adopted for the large screens
of PCs, although increasingly they are adapting to the small smartphone devices. Ac-
cording to the survey by Forrester Research, the estimated transaction volume is to
grow to e172 billion by 2016 from e96.6 billion in 2011 [97]. However, this growth
can be proven fragile since a large number of security concerns exist - this fact may
undermine the confidence of customers.
Unfortunately, the exchange of large amounts of money and the billions of transac-
tions every year, attract malicious groups and individuals that aim to steal valuable
customer data and indeed their money. These targets include credit card data that are
then used directly for fraudulent purchases or sold on to other criminals. Malicious
entities target both users and merchants using malware, such as trojan horses and
keyloggers [98]. A common practice for merchants is to store cardholder data in their
back end systems for various reasons (recurring transactions, dispute, etc.). However,
this practice has vulnerabilities and in the past there were incidents of massive data
exposure due to attacks targeting merchants [99]. In some instances data leaked not
as a result of an attack, but due to operational mistakes [100]. This led the five major
card brands (VISA, MasterCard, American Express, JCB, Discover) to create the Pay-
ment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) [60] aimed at raising merchant
security. Merchants are required to be certified and the ones that do not comply to
the standard may face large fines, increased charges and/or the removal of the facility
to accept payments by credit/debit cards [101]. Additionally, on the ‘user side’ there
are commercial programs that claim to improve security of sensitive data submission
on the Internet like e.g. Kaspersky’s ‘Safe Money’ [102] or Trusteer’s Rapport [103].
However and despite these attempts, credit/debit card fraud is still a large problem for
e-commerce [104].
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The proposal described in this chapter achieves its aims through the use of a cred-
it/debit card (for traditional PCs) or SIM card (for phones) that embeds a SCWS.
The basic advantages of this proposal are:
1. Users that wish to shop online, either from a phone or a PC, are not required to
submit any card details. They are just expected to know a PIN number and be
in possession of the card.
2. Merchants never receive any cardholder data, instead they receive a single use
virtual credit card number (for an example see [105]). As a result, merchants do
not have to store or protect any card data in their back end databases/systems,
thus they are less affected by PCI DSS requirements [106]. The economic advan-
tage of avoiding a number of PCI DSS requirements depends on the size of the
company, but it is certainly an important factor.
3. The cardholder data are transferred encrypted at all times and are only visible
to the issuing bank.
4. There is no need for third parties e.g. PayPal.
5. Only standard protocols are used (HTTPS) [107].
6. There is no need for installation of any special application for the user, since only
a standard browser is required.
7. Card data are stored inside a widespread and proven tamper resistant security
token; a smart card.
8. The use of the Remote Administration Server (in the case of the SIM card) allows
for the secure transfer of data, information, code and anything else required for
the solution to work (the entire communication takes place over HTTPS).
9. New possibilities are opened for the convenience of the user e.g. a user can browse
the SCWS and check previous payments/transactions.
The chapter is structured as follows: Section 5.2 outlines the current payment solutions
for PCs and smartphones, Section 5.3 presents the proposed architecture, Section 5.4
is a security analysis of the proposal, while Section 5.5 discusses possible attacks and
how they are mitigated by this proposal. Section 5.6 provides a formal analysis of the
protocol and Section 5.7 concludes the chapter.
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5.2 Other Solutions
A lot of related work, (both academically and commercially driven) is taking place
regarding e/m-shopping/payments security. We differentiate between e-commerce and
m-commerce, with the former using a traditional computing device like a PC or a
laptop, and the latter using mobile devices (mainly smartphones and tablets). Note
that a smartphone and its browser can be used for conventional e-commerce, whereas
a desktop PC typically cannot support m-commerce.
5.2.1 Electronic Shopping
A typical sequence of actions during an electronic shopping (e-shopping) session is:
1. The user checks out after choosing the goods/services she wants to purchase.
2. Then the user is prompted to select a payment method. Most common choices
include paying by a credit/debit card or using a payment service e.g. PayPal.
3. Once the user authorises the payment, the card details are send to the issuing
bank, through the acquirer and the payment brand. The issuing bank verifies the
ability of the customer to pay or not and the transaction concludes.
The payment methods are crucial to transaction security and to the disclosure of cus-
tomer data, and so the options are now discussed in more detail.
1. A merchant may allow the customer to submit card details (the card number i.e.
Primary Account Number, cardholder’s name, card expiration date, Card Veri-
fication Value(CVV)/Card Verification Code (CVC)) directly to the merchant’s
website. The merchant then submits to the bank the details for transaction au-
thorisation without storing them.
2. There are websites on the Internet that allow a user to save the details of a normal
credit/debit card, to simplify future purchases, as then the user is just asked to
login to the website and confirm the payment. A common example of such a
website is Amazon [108].
3. Using a payment service such as PayPal or Google Wallet [109] [110]. The mer-
chant supports this type of payment through the inclusion of a button that redi-
rects the customer to the payment service’s website. In order for a transaction
to proceed, the user has to have an account with the service (including a pre-
registered payment card). The security of the whole procedure depends on the
password that the shopper creates and uses to login to the service. Once logged
in, she is not required to submit any card details (they are stored in the service’s
databases); she just confirms the payment.
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4. Using prepaid cards (e.g. PayPal’s prepaid card [109]). The shopper has to top-
up the card credit before using it to purchase goods. The advantage of using
cards of this type is that even if the card details are stolen, the person loses only
the limited amount of card credit. The payment procedure is the same as with
credit/debit cards, i.e. the user has to submit the card and delivery details. It
must be noted however that there are merchants/shops on the Internet that do
not accept payments with prepaid cards and that some payment services and/or
banks stopped offering this service.
5. Using disposable cards (called virtual credit cards or one-time cards). The vir-
tual/disposable card is linked to the actual credit card and the user has to use a
client program (most commonly a browser) to contact the issuer in order for the
latter to create and send her the one-time credit card details. The card is for a
single use only and cannot be used by an attacker after the transaction concludes.
Our proposal uses a single use virtual credit card [105].
6. Due to implications and mandates of PCI DSS and instances of data breaches, a
number of merchants are no longer willing to store payment data. They prefer
to use the services of a payment gateway, which acts on their behalf, accepting
the card details from the user, submitting it for authorisation and informing the
merchant. The user is asked to submit the card details either to a new website
that pops up or to an inline frame within the merchant’s website. This frame is
operated by the payment gateway and the merchant does not receive any card
details [111].
5.2.2 Mobile Shopping
Mobile shopping (m-shopping) offers newer payment methods for customers. Using a
phone, a person is able to pay in-shop using Near Field Communication (NFC) [112] [113],
which for example allows the phone to emulate payment cards or to read external cards.
Alternatively, the phone can be used to make m-payments to merchants via the Inter-
net, which is the focus for the research described in this chapter. A person is able to
pay using her phone in a variety of ways, including the following examples.
1. Using SMS messages. In most instances the customer is required to send one
(or more) SMS messages to premium numbers in order for her to be able to pay
for the product/service. In some instances a user receives a PIN number after
sending the required SMS and inputs this PIN as proof of payment [114].
2. Through direct mobile billing. Instead of paying using a card, a user may choose
to include the purchase amount on her next mobile phone bill. The user effectively
defers payment to the time when she pays for her mobile phone bill [115].
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3. Using e-payment solutions. This means that a user browses normally through
a website and when required to pay, she uses one of the conventional solutions
mentioned above (in the e-payments section).
4. Using special applications that run on mobile platforms (Android, iOS, etc.). An
example is Amazon applications that can be used with most of the popular mobile
operating systems.
The payment solutions described thus far do not make use of the SCWS which is a
fundamental component of our solution. In the next section, we will describe in detail
the architecture of the proposed solution.
5.3 Proposed Architecture
The proposal presented in this chapter can be implemented on two different platforms,
both of which must be able to host a SCWS:
1. On a SIM card.
2. On a ‘normal’ smart card like a credit or debit card.
The SCWS described in the OMA specification is used in conjunction with a SIM card,
thus the SIM card acts as its host and the SCWS can be used with a phone. To our
knowledge there is no mention anywhere for a Smart Card Web Server that will run
inside a normal credit/debit card. A SIM card web server (as we can call an SCWS of
the first category) does not need anything else apart from the SIM and the phone to
operate, while for the credit/debit card web server (an SCWS of the second category)
a reader or a relevant slot (for smart cards) on the PC/laptop is needed.
Another major difference between the two choices is that in the case of the credit/debit
card solution the key management and the distribution of the cards/cardholder data is
relatively simple since the only entities involved are the user and the issuing bank (the
issuing bank or ‘Issuer’ is the bank that originally issues the credit/debit card to the
user and is responsible for checking if a particular credit/debit card can be used for a
certain transaction - the ‘Acquirer’ is the bank that has a contractual agreement with
the merchant and deposits the transaction money to its account after the payment is
authorised by the issuing bank). This is not the case for the SIM based approach, since
for a user to receive the cardholder data in her SIM card, there have to be agreements
and explicit trust between the bank and the MNO. The MNO is unavoidably enmeshed
in the whole procedure since in some way it will be involved, either by providing space
in the SIM card for the issuing bank to fully administer or just being a ‘mere conduit’
for the transfer of the card data on the SIM. In this case the MNO acts as the issuer
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of the ‘hardware’ i.e. the SIM card and the bank as the issuer of the data that will be
transferred and stored on the SIM by the MNO. For the purposes of this chapter and
whenever the term ‘Issuer’ is used we mean the issuing bank.
The proposed protocol flow remains the same for both options, although option 1
(on a SIM card) is currently being tested and SIM cards of this type already exist
experimentally, whereas option 2 (on a ‘normal’ smart card) is considered to be a new
proposal of this chapter.
5.3.1 Basic Assumptions
We claim that the protocol offers the desired level of security, while at the same time
maintains its usability and ease of use for the common user. However, some basic
assumptions have to be made prior to the description of the protocol itself.
1. For the security of data-in-transit we rely on HTTPS. While HTTPS is the de
facto solution for the Internet, any severe vulnerabilities found will affect the
security of our solution. On the same level, support for HTTPS from all entities
involved is unquestionable, although for the communication between the acquirer,
payment brand and issuer other protocols or architectures (private networks,
virtual or not) may be used. In any case data-in-transit should be protected to
the best possible level.
2. For this proposal to work, we rely on a pre-existing hierarchical PKI infrastruc-
ture. The issuing bank will act as the signed certificate provider for the cards,
while the merchant will obtain a certificate signed by its acquirer. Both the is-
suer and the acquirer will have their certificates signed by a common and trusted
Payment Brand such as Visa or Mastercard. An issuer would check a merchant
certificate signature, by first verifying the signature on the acquirer certificate.
This way the issuer will have reasonable assurance that is communicating with
a valid merchant and not some bogus entity. It is expected that all certificates
follow the X.509 standard [116].
3. The last part of the message exchange (between the acquirer and the issuer
through the Card Payment Network) relies on existing architectures and is gen-
erally considered to be secure. In general both the acquirer and the issuer trust
the payment brand and the latter is the connecting and trusted point between
the entities.
4. Settlement and arrangement of payment are out of scope for this chapter, however
common practices are expected to take place.
5. Finally, when the SCWS is stored on the SIM card, we have to consider the
MNO as a trusted entity (in the sense that it will not undermine by any means
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the security of the data stored on the card) and assume that all the necessary
countermeasures and contractual agreements are in place. In such occasion the
MNO will be considered as a ‘mere conduit’.
Table 5.1: E-Payments Notation
Notation Description
USR User
MER Merchant
ISS Issuer/Issuing Bank
ACQ Acquirer/Acquiring Bank
SCWS Smart Card Web Server
MID Merchand ID
MNAME Merchant Name
TDLS Transaction Details (amount, date,
time, merchant’s transaction ID)
TREF Issuer’s Transaction Reference
PAN Primary Account Number
TPAN Temporary PAN
EXP DATE Card Expiration Date
CNAME Cardholder Name
CVV/CVC Card Verification Value
(3 or 4 digits number)
CNTR Freshness Counter
AUTH REQ Authorisation Request
AUTH RES Authorisation Result
T RES Transaction Result
PUBIss Issuer Public Key
PUBMer Merchant Public Key
PUBAcq Acquirer Public Key
PRIss Issuer Private Key
PRMer Merchant Private Key
PRCard Card Private Key
CertIss Issuer Certificate
CertMer Merchant Certificate
CertAcq Acquirer Certificate
SIG Signature of Data Using a Private Key
5.3.2 Description of the Protocol Flow
Below follows a description of the protocol flow depicted in Figures 5.1 and 5.2. Addi-
tionally the reader can find all relevant notations in Table 5.1.
1. A user browses the merchant’s website and goes to checkout. She chooses to pay
85
5
.3
P
ro
p
o
se
d
A
rch
ite
c
tu
re
Merchant Acquirer
IssuerUser Browser
SCWS
Payment Brand
1 2
3
4
5
6
7 8
9
10
Figure 5.1: E-Payments Protocol Diagram
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using the SCWS and informs the merchant about this by selecting the appropriate
choice.
2. The merchant prepares the link that points to the SCWS and which includes
all the necessary information for the transaction i.e. the amount, date/time, a
Transaction ID (we call these the Transaction Details - TDLS) and two URLs that
the bank will later use (step 6) to redirect the user’s browser in case of successful
or unsuccessful result. The merchant signs this information using its private key
(PRMer) and attaches its certificate CertMer and the acquirer’s certificate CertAcq
(that is used to verify the merchant’s certificate). We name this string of data
as MTOKEN. The merchant presents the link to the user through her browser.
The latter clicks the link and is transferred to the SCWS environment. The entire
communication takes place over HTTPS. It has to be mentioned that the browser
is just the standard PC or phone browser.
3. The user is now in the SCWS environment (meaning that the web page presented
to her is created by the SCWS) and is asked for her PIN. She inputs the PIN in
her browser and this is transmitted to the SCWS over HTTPS.
4. If the PIN is correct, a Java servlet running inside the card, retrieves the card data
that reside in the card and prepares a token that includes: the Primary Account
Number (PAN) of the card, the Expiration Date (EXP DATE), the CVV/CVC,
the Cardholder’s Name (CNAME) and an updated value of a counter (CNTR)
that will help mitigate replay attacks. It then creates a signature of all the above
information using the card’s Private Key(PRCard) and encrypts everything using
the issuer’s public key (PUBIss). We name this cryptogram as STOKEN. The
SCWS presents a link that points to a pre-stored URL/Domain Name of the
issuing bank.
5. The user is presented with the link and once she clicks it, she is transferred to
the issuing bank’s domain.
6. The issuing bank receives the information, i.e the MTOKEN and the STOKEN.
It goes through the necessary decryption and verification process, thus retrieving
the card data and the TDLS and verifying the attached signatures. It does all
the necessary back end checks to ensure whether the card can be used for the
transaction (for example if the card can pay for the amount): if so, it creates a
single use virtual card number (TPAN) that is associated with both the original
card number (PAN) and this specific transaction. It also adds a transaction ref-
erence for future acknowledgement (TREF). This data is signed using the issuer’s
private key (PRIss) and encrypted using the merchant’s public key (PUBMer) -
the issuer also attaches its public key certificate (CertIss). Finally, it redirects the
user to the MID URL YES. If for any reason the transaction is declined, the user
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is redirected to the MID URL NO and neither TPAN nor TREF is created and
sent.
7. The merchant receives this cryptogram (in case of a positive reply from the issuing
bank) and decrypts it using its private key (PRMer), thus receiving the TPAN
and TREF - it also checks the validity of the signature using the issuing bank’s
public key (retrieved from the certificate). Otherwise and in case of a negative
reply from the issuing bank, it informs the user and either prompts her to use
another payment option, try again or simply rejects the entire transaction and
terminates the session. If the merchant proceeds with the transaction, it sends
the necessary information to the acquirer. The message that is sent includes the
MID, MName, the TPAN, the TREF and any other information necessary for
the acquirer to proceed. It then creates a signature of all the above information
using its private key(PRMer) and encrypts everything using the acquirer’s public
key (PUBAcq).
8. The acquirer receives the cryptogram and decrypts it. If the necessary checks
e.g. on the MID, MNAME, signature created by the merchant, are correct and
the signature is valid, it sends an Authorisation Request (AUTH REQ) to the
issuer. To do so, it forwards the transaction to the payment brand’s network (e.g.
VISANet).
9. The issuer receives the info from the payment brand and checks the pair TPAN
and TREF against the ones that were originally created (step 6). If the check is
successful, the issuer informs the payment brand and through it the acquirer and
the merchant (Authorisation Result - AUTH RES).
10. The merchant displays the transaction result to the user (Transaction Result -
T RES) and completes the process.
The next section provides a security analysis of the aforementioned architecture.
5.4 Security Analysis
The security of this proposal is outlined in this section:
• The biggest difference for a person that uses this method for payment (compared
to traditional ways), is that she never has to submit her cardholder data during a
transaction. The Primary Account Number (PAN), the Cardholder’s Name, the
CVV/CVC and the Expiration Date never leave the environment of the smart
card in unencrypted form.
• All data in transit is protected by HTTPS. Although HTTPS suffers from certain
vulnerabilities [117], it is still the de facto solution for secure transfer of data on
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Step Source Message Destination
Checkout
1 USR MER
2 MER (TDLS‖MID URL Y ES USR
‖MID URL NO‖(SIG)PRMer‖ CertMer‖CertAcq)HTTPS
(PIN)HTTPS
3 USR SCWS
4 SCWS (PAN‖EXP DATE‖CV V ‖CNAME‖CNTR
‖(SIG)PRCard)PUBIss
5 SCWS (MToken‖SToken)HTTPS ISS
6 ISS ((TPAN‖TREF‖(SIG)PRIss )PUBMer‖CertIss)HTTPS MER
7 MER (MID‖MNAME‖TPAN‖TREF‖(SIG)PRMer)PUBAcq ACQ
8 ACQ AUTH REQ ISS
9 ISS AUTH RES ACQ/MER
10 MER T RES USR
Figure 5.2: E-Payments Protocol Flow
the Internet. Almost every website that requires a certain level of security (e-
banking, e-commerce/business, authentication, etc.), relies on the security offered
by HTTPS.
• In case that HTTPS is proven to not provide the necessary level of security (if new,
severe vulnerabilities are found), the cardholder data is always transmitted en-
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crypted using algorithms compliant with information security best practices [118].
• Replay attacks are defended against by the use of a freshness counter.
• Alteration of data is difficult to achieve since messages are encrypted and signed
and even if successful can be detected.
• Only the issuer sees the cardholder data: it is not available to the merchant or
any other party. Thus, if a user pays exclusively by this method for the entire life
of the card (until its expiration date) the cardholder data will never be submitted
anywhere other than back to the issuer (and always encrypted).
• User convenience is enhanced without compromising the security of the proposal.
Currently, a user should submit card details every time she needs to purchase
something or risk reliance on a third party (e.g. PayPal). This proposal requires
the user to simply click on two browser links and submit a PIN number, thus
achieving a practical balance between user convenience and security.
• The implications for merchants are positive too. In conventional transactions,
a user is typically required to submit the cardholder data to the merchant, for
the latter to proceed with the transaction. However, this makes the merchants
responsible for the safekeeping of the data. Unfortunately there have been nu-
merous instances in the past, where cardholder data was successfully retrieved by
attackers or simply lost, to the penalty of merchants and customers alike. Under
the new proposal, a merchant would not have to store or process any raw card
data, thus avoiding the burden associated with PCI DSS compliance [13].
• Cardholder data is protected against attack and disclosure while stored within
the SCWS as we benefit from the physical security and tamper resistance of the
smart card. Even if smart cards can be attacked, a malicious entity should be in
possession of the card itself.
• PIN discovery is always a possibility as we rely on the mobile device and keylog-
gers, trojan horses, general malware, remote attacks (and even phishing) might
develop to capture and export the user PIN, however this would be of little use
to attackers unless they also have possession of the associated smart card.
5.5 Possible Attacks/Mitigation
Just like any other payment solution, this proposal has to be as secure as possible to
mitigate any possible attempted attacks against its security and ultimately, that of the
cardholder data. Some types of attack and potential mitigation are discussed below.
1. Modification: This attack is difficult to achieve, since data in transit is signed.
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2. Eavesdropping: This should not be possible, since data transfers are encrypted
using algorithms and keys compliant with best practices [118].
3. DoS attacks: Malware could theoretically attack the SCWS in order for it not
be able to receive/process/send the data. However for this to have a widespread
effect the attacker would have to target many user phones (if the SCWS is running
in the SIM card).
4. Attacks against the PIN: Even if malware is able to steal the PIN number, this is
practically useless since the attacker has to be in possession of the card to perform
transactions.
5. Attacks against the card: Smart cards are widespread and proven security tokens.
Although they are not tamper proof (attacks are reported against them e.g. [119]),
they can be extremely tamper resistant, rendering most forms of attack practically
infeasible.
6. Replay attacks: These attacks [120] are difficult to launch since the STOKEN
includes a freshness counter. Even if malware prevents the browser from sending
this token and steals it, the outcome is not in favour of the attacker (she cannot
retrieve, alter or use the encrypted data).
7. Phishing websites: A user may still be tricked to visit a bogus website however
this will not result in any of the SCWS stored data being disclosed, removing any
benefit for the attacker.
8. Merchant insider attacks: Such attacks are less of a concern (compared to a
conventional approach) as the merchant no longer holds cardholder data.
5.6 Formal Analysis of the Protocol
For the formal/verification analysis of the protocol discussed in this chapter, we used
the code presented in Appendix B. The basic entities are MER (merchant), USR (user),
SCWS, ISS (issuer) and ACQ (acquirer). Next to them are the claims for each of these
entities and possible attacks are defined in the last two columns. See below the analy-
sis of the protocol in Figures 5.3, 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6. Scyther also identified an attack as
shown in Figure 5.7.
This attack affects step 7 of the protocol and assumes that the attacker sends fake
data to the acquirer i.e. TREF, TPAN, MName and MID, signs them with her private
key and then encrypts everything with a fake public key. We believe that the latter
shows that the tool did not properly identify what is happening in this step. Encrypt-
ing something with the attackers public key does not offer anything to the attacker.
91
5.6 Formal Analysis of the Protocol
Figure 5.3: E-Payments Protocol Formal Analysis (1/4)
92
5.6 Formal Analysis of the Protocol
Figure 5.4: E-Payments Protocol Formal Analysis (2/4)
Figure 5.5: E-Payments Protocol Formal Analysis (3/4)
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Figure 5.6: E-Payments Protocol Formal Analysis (4/4)
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Figure 5.7: E-Payments Protocol Attack
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The conclusion of this chapter is now described in the section that follows.
5.7 Conclusion of the Chapter
In this chapter we saw a way of using the SCWS to secure payments and transactions
on the Web. The user does not need to submit any cardholder details anywhere, a fact
that raises the security of payments on the Internet.
In the next chapter we will expand the idea of using the SCWS in a way to sup-
port and secure the authentication process for a user of a virtual world. The use of
a SIM card and of an SCWS, will allow for an easy integration with a virtual world
environment, without compromising the security of the entire process.
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This chapter is based on the paper Virtual World Authentication Using the Smart Card
Web Server, International Symposium in Security in Computing and Communications
(SSCC’13), Mysore, India.
In the previous chapter we presented a way to allow payments on the Web by using the
SIM or the debit/credit card as a means to conduct transactions in a card-present way.
The user does not need to submit or remember any cardholder data or provide these
data when trying to purchase on the Web, thus raising the protection level for both
cardholders and merchants alike. This chapter will depict how we can use the SCWS
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Figure 6.1: Virtual World1
during the authentication process on the Web. A use case that will depict such func-
tionality is when the user wants to authenticate against a virtual world environment.
6.1 Introduction
The term ‘Virtual World’ (VW) has been defined as ‘a synchronous, persistent network
of people, represented as avatars, facilitated by networked computers’ [121]. VWs are
very popular: at the beginning of 2012, there were 1,921 million registered accounts in
over 100 VWs [122]. Some VWs aim to mimic real life as closely as possible in a digital
environment e.g. Second Life, by Linden Labs [123]. Others are designed as game en-
vironments, where the objective is to complete quests and enhance your avatar’s skills
and reputation, for example Blizzard’s World of Warcraft [124]. Figure 6.1 shows a
screenshot of a VW.
Authentication procedures for VW users are currently fairly limited, mostly relying
on static, easily compromised username/password combinations. This can result in a
number of security issues with real world consequences e.g. virtual goods/identities can
be stolen if an account is hacked, with the danger that the user’s computer can then
be compromised or real world identity theft could occur [125].
Using a mobile phone as a second factor in online authentication (i.e. something you
have/something you know) should improve security. There are several existing mobile
phone authentication options e.g. using SMS messages [127], or optical challenge-
1Image by Jo Yardley, distributed under a Creative Commons, Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported
license [126]. No modifications made to the image.
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response procedures [128]. Mobile phone operating systems are increasingly becoming
targets for malware, however [129]. Storing credentials in a tamper resistant device,
such as the SIM card, is therefore a more attractive approach. This chapter proposes a
system that uses a SIM equipped with a SCWS in a one-time password (OTP) authen-
tication scheme. Including geolocation [130] in the protocol introduces another obstacle
for a potential attacker to overcome, by checking if the phone and PC are in the same
geographical area. The aim is to significantly improve the security of the VW login,
without unduly inconveniencing the user, and so enhance user and merchant confidence
in VW security and services offered to users.
The chapter is structured as follows: the technical architecture of VWs is outlined
in Section 6.2 and the proposed protocol is described in Section 6.3. A preliminary
security analysis of the proposal is done in Section 6.4, a formal analysis of the pro-
tocol using the Scyther tool is presented in Section 6.5, before the chapter reaches its
conclusion in Section 6.6.
6.2 Virtual World Infrastructure
To connect to a VW the user needs client software, typically installed on a PC, repre-
sented as C1-C5 in Figure 6.2. The VW Client (VWC) can be regarded as a special
kind of viewer or browser, in that the client gets data from a remote server, and renders
it into a visual representation for the user to interact with. The VW environment is
provided by the VW infrastructure i.e. a VW cloud consisting of a set of servers. There
are load balancers, front end servers (denoted as S1, S2, S3 in Figure 6.2), and back end
facilities usually composed of databases/VW rules which apply to interactions with ob-
jects/avatars inside the world. This infrastructure is subdivided into components and
processes, used to conduct particular tasks and introduce modularity [131] [132]: e.g. a
login component, a user component and a data component [133]. The proposal in this
chapter is concerned with the login server processes which handle the initial request
from the user to log into the world.
Now that VW technical architecture has been described, the proposed protocol will
be detailed in the next section: however, the necessary entities and assumptions, along
with OTP processing and geolocation techniques will be outlined first.
6.3 The Proposed SCWS Authentication Protocol
6.3.1 Entities and Assumptions
Entities: The entities in the proposal are described in Table 6.1, and their relationship
is shown in Figure 6.3. Notation used is in Table 6.2.
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Figure 6.2: Virtual World Infrastructure
Assumptions: The following assumptions are made:
1. Business relationships: The MNO has a business relationship with the VW
developers, and has authorised their use of a Remote Administration Server to
update the SCWS VW application and data.
2. Users per SCWS: The mobile phone has a one-to-one mapping to the user, i.e.
only one registered user can use a particular SCWS.
3. Registration: A secure user registration procedure is in place. The exact de-
tails are out of the scope of this chapter, but a user must supply credentials such
as mobile phone number/PIN so that the RAS can download the application/-
credentials onto the correct phone and the PIN number can be used to create
the OTP during the protocol. The VW authentication Java servlet will then
be installed on the user’s SIM, along with the user’s PIN to access the SCWS.
Additionally, during registration, a VW certificate will be installed on the user’s
VW Client to offer mutual authentication.
4. Channel Security: Channels between the RAS/SCWS, and VWC/VWS are
considered secure, since all data in transit is transferred over HTTPS.
100
6.3 The Proposed SCWS Authentication Protocol
Table 6.1: Description of Entities
Notation Description
VW The virtual world. Has details of all user credentials. It
is responsible for checking user login details and creating
one-time passwords.
VWS Virtual World Server. Provides back end functionality for
the VW, with all necessary information to keep the VW
operating. It connects with back end processes such as the
database and the login server.
LS Login Server. Part of the virtual world, this manages login
details, authenticates users, creates the nonce (N) and OTP,
then checks the OTP sent by the VWC.
SCWS Smart Card Web Server. The user accesses the SCWS en-
vironment using a PIN. The SCWS uses a Java servlet to
process and display the OTP.
AA Administration Agent: an on-SIM entity that establishes a
HTTPS connection with the RAS.
VWC Virtual World Client. This is the interface presented to the
user, installed on the user’s PC. It provides just a graphical
user interface, and is considered insecure.
RAS Remote Administration Server. It updates the SCWS of a
registered phone via the MNO’s Full Administration Proto-
col, using HTTPS. It is a trusted entity, and can be operated
by the MNO or a trusted third party. The RAS can also de-
termine the phone’s location (as it is a part of the MNO).
U User. An individual who is registered with a VW.
6.3.2 One-Time Passwords and Geolocation
One-Time Passwords: Many VWs use a simple username/password as the user
authentication mechanism at login, relying on static data for security; this may be
captured and exploited via a range of IT security attacks. The general principle be-
hind the proposed protocol is that an OTP generating process is done both at the
VW back end and by the SCWS, using a nonce N and the user’s PIN. Thus the use
of a static password is replaced by that of a dynamically created one on a separate
personal device, using a tamper resistant chip (the SIM), and connected via a different
communications channel. Having an OTP generator on the VW server side means it
benefits from the VW server’s existing security, which is reasonably expected to be of
a considerably higher level than on the VW client. The OTP should have a number of
security properties: e.g. easy to compute, but very difficult to identify the PIN/ nonce
used to create it; have a minimum length of 64 bits; and be created using cryptograph-
ically secure, standardised pseudo-random number generators such as RFC4226 [134].
A compromise of usability and security will be needed: e.g. a user may be prepared
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Figure 6.3: Relationship Between Entities
to type in a maximum of eight alphanumeric digits and so the OTP must be mapped
to this field size; PIN size is crucial for the entropy of the OTP, however a small PIN
size increases usability, but decreases security (and vice versa). Common practice for
financial institutions and MNOs is to use sizes of 4 and 5 digits, with the maximum
number of PIN entry attempts limited to 3 to protect against exhaustive (brute force)
attacks .
Geolocation: The phone and VWC’s locations are also used as a further obstacle
for a potential attacker. The phone’s location could be determined by either the cell
towers of the mobile network or through the GPS adapter. Equivalently IP geolocation
could be used to find the client’s location. The authentication is successful if both loca-
tions are within a certain distance of each other. While IP geolocation is not extremely
accurate, it is currently used by large organisations to counteract attacks originating
some distance from the genuine user.
Note: privacy issues arising from the use of geolocation services are out of scope for
this thesis.
6.3.3 The Authentication Protocol
The steps in the protocol are now described (see Figures 6.4 and 6.5).
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Table 6.2: Virtual Worlds Authentication Notation
Notation Description
F Function used for one-time password generation
N Nonce
ID Any form of user identity, like a username or other identifier
PIN The PIN number that the user uses to login to the SCWS
OTP One-Time Password: The OTP that is generated as the re-
sult of function F in both the login server and the SCWS
LocVWC The location of the VWC
LocPhone The location of the phone
Step 1: The user initiates the VWC installed on their PC, and is requested to input
their unique ID credentials (e.g. VW username/user ID).
Step 2: The VWC software initiates a secure connection (HTTPS) with the VWS.
Both the VWS and the VWC have a digital certificate, so that mutual authentication
is achieved. The client software sends the ID credentials to the VWS over this secure
channel.
Step 3: The VWS identifies this as a secure login request and passes it to the LS.
Step 4: The LS checks the ID credentials: e.g. whether the user is already logged in,
or has been banned due to some previous illicit action. If the credentials are acceptable,
a time constrained authentication protocol is initialised. The LS creates a nonce (N),
and an OTP in combination with the user’s PIN i.e. OTP = f(N,PIN). This OTP is
stored securely in the LS. The VWS has substantial power, so OTP generation will not
impact its performance. It must be noted that the OTP is only valid for a limited time
period.
Step 5: The LS transmits N back to the VWS. Since both these servers are internal
to the VW they are assumed to be secure and trusted.
Step 6: The VWS forwards N to the RAS. These entities also trust each other, and
the connection between them is also established over a secure channel.
Step 7: The RAS determines the location of the phone (LocPhone) and returns it to
the VWS.
Step 8: The VWS forwards the LocPhone to the LS.
Step 9: Once it receives N from the VWS, the RAS will establish an HTTPS connec-
tion with the user’s SIM card and transfer N to the SCWS.
Step 10: Once N has been securely transferred to the SCWS, the user will connect to
the SCWS via a link shown on the phone’s browser. The user will be asked to input
their PIN: if correct the OTP generation process is initialised.
Step 11: The PIN number is used as input to the same function used in the LS along
with the nonce N that was received during step 9, to reproduce the OTP. This number
is transformed into an eight byte alphanumeric string.
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Step 12: The SCWS returns this string to the phone’s browser via HTTPS.
Step 13: The user inputs the displayed OTP manually into the VWC. This is a time-
constrained action; the LS must receive the OTP within a certain period.
Step 14: The entered OTP will be forwarded to the VWS (along with VWC’s location
LocVWC) over the previously established HTTPS connection.
Step 15: When the OTP/LocVWC pair reaches the VWS and is verified as authentic,
it is forwarded to the LS.
Step 16: When the LS receives OTP/LocVWC pair, it will compare the OTP against
the previously created OTP (step 4) and check the location of the PC client LocVWC
against the location of the phone LocPhone from (step 8)
Step 17: Successful checks authenticate the user on the LS: the VWS is notified.
Step 18: A message is sent to the VWC saying that the user is logged in. The VWC
refreshes to the standard layout and user enters the VW.
A preliminary security analysis of the protocol will now be conducted.
6.4 Security Analysis of the Protocol
The objective of this protocol is to give an assurance that if avatar X is in the virtual
world then we can reasonably assume that its legitimate real world controller (user
X) has logged in by using two-factor authentication. The protocol also takes into
consideration usability as one of the factors of security. There are several potential
attack points which need to be considered with regard to the protocol’s overall security,
and these will be now analysed.
6.4.1 SCWS and Mobile Phone
Physical security of the SIM: The SCWS is only accessible from the RAS or
the phone browser and a malicious party needs to have physical access to the mobile
phone to retrieve security information sent from the RAS. The information is processed
by an servlet on the tamper resistant SIM/SCWS. To retrieve information about the
servlet/algorithms/nonces used, etc, an attacker has to physically attack a SIM card
or to know the correct SCWS PIN.
Web based attacks against the SCWS: The SCWS is a web server and as such
the OWASP Top Ten attacks [88] still apply (as shown in Table 4.3), but the potential
to mount these from the phone browser is limited and remote access to the SCWS is
only permitted from the trusted RAS. The small attack surface of the restricted SCWS
environment means that attackers have fewer opportunities to attack compared to a
‘traditional’ web server. All web pages stored on the SCWS have little processing or
scripting in them, which minimises attack potential. For more information, please see
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Figure 6.4: Virtual World Protocol Flow (Steps 1-9)
Table 4.3.
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Figure 6.5: Virtual World Protocol Flow (Steps 10-18)
Malware on the phone: If phone malware steals the nonce from the SIM, it will still
need the PIN number to generate the full OTP. If the malware is able to retrieve the
106
6.4 Security Analysis of the Protocol
OTP after this is created on the phone and/or is able to detect the phone’s location,
the attacker has to pass the OTP and the location information to a VWC before the
legitimate user does so, which may represent a timing challenge. Malware on the phone
alone, does not have the necessary potential to become a threat, since it also needs a
PC client under the attacker’s control to succeed with the attack.
Security of the RAS: The RAS is defined as a trusted entity in the assumptions,
and therefore it is hard to attack. The RAS could be considered a single point of fail-
ure, but as it is owned/operated by an MNO or a trusted third party, it should have
restricted and controlled physical access so any unauthorised usage will be difficult. In
this proposal, it is used as a mere conduit between the VW server and the SCWS, and
does not store any secrets. The channel between the RAS and the SCWS is protected
by HTTPS, and therefore has typical secure channel properties.
The OTP and the use of the PIN: The idea behind recreating the OTP is to
mitigate the risk of mobile trojans stealing the PIN (as is the case with malware that
is able to steal SMS messages that are sent as part of the authentication process as a
second factor). The OTP will also not be created unless the user provides the PIN. So
even if the malware steals N (which in any case is transfered over HTTPS, so there is
another level of protection), it will not be able to recreate the OTP, unless it knows
the PIN. The PIN is also useful in case the phone is stolen. In that instance the new
holder of the phone will not be able to recreate OTPs unless she knows the PIN of
the original user. Other OTP generators (such as Google Authenticator) do not offer
such functionality (once someone gets hold of the phone there is nothing to stop them
accessing and use the OTP application) or even if they offer (as is the case with Mo-
bilePASS+ from Gemalto), they do not run inside the tamper resistant environment
of the SIM, thus they are vulnerable to attacks from malicious applications running on
the phone.
6.4.2 Virtual World Back End Server
There is a generic attack which this protocol does not seek to address. If VW servers are
compromised, this protocol will not protect the user or the VW developers. Malicious
entities can get full control over the back end of the VW, and a user/avatar can then
be impersonated. If the login server is compromised, the entire procedure fails and the
malicious party can produce OTPs at will.
6.4.3 VW Client and Client PC
VWC and PC Security: The VW client is the easiest target to attack. In current
VW login procedures, if a malicious user steals a user ID/password and downloads the
appropriate VWC, a genuine user can be impersonated. However, in this proposed
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system, stealing the user ID is not enough to complete the login, as the user’s SCWS/-
phone is also required. The advantage of this proposal compared to current practices
is that if a static password is stolen, it can be used until the genuine user changes it,
whereas with OTPs, an attacker gains access to one session only. Within this context, a
reasonable compromise between security and usability is achieved. A highly motivated
and knowledgeable attacker could still target a particular user/avatar, but the proposal
sets more challenges for them to overcome.
Physical compromise of the VWC: If there is a physical attack on the VWC
equipment i.e. the computer is stolen, the malicious user will not be able to login into
the VW system as the real authentication secret is sent to the phone. If the phone is
stolen in addition to the computer then the attacker would also have to input the PIN
on the phone to retrieve the OTP information from the SCWS, or physically attack
the SCWS/SIM card.
Malware on the client PC: If there is malware on the client computer e.g. a
keylogger which records the OTP as it is input by the user [98], it will not gain any
advantage, as the short validity period of the OTP means that authentication will prob-
ably complete before the malicious entity can mount an attack. If the malware is able
to perform a DoS attack against the VWC, so that the user will not be able to submit
the OTP, it still needs to spoof the IP address of the user. A certificate is also used to
bind the VW client to the VW server, so malware would also have to steal or replicate
this certificate and the corresponding private key for a successful attack. Although
these attacks are possible, using the SCWS in conjunction with the PC will increase
the complexity faced by malicious entities and may discourage less-motivated/unskilled
attackers.
Mutual authentication: In order to provide mutual authentication it is assumed
that the VW client is given a VW certificate during registration. We acknowledge that
issuing a certificate to all these VW clients may be a cumbersome task. Authenticating
a client using a certificate is generally considered a best practice. Our protocol can
function without the client certificate, however there will be one less layer of protec-
tion. We also acknowledge that even with the certificate in place, a malicious entity
can possibly reverse engineer an application and identify the location of the certificates
and/or the accompanying private keys or even develop malicious programs that could
attack the application and steal these credentials. However, due to the fact that there
exist no application that is impenetrable, we anticipate that the extra layers of security
can provide a certain level of protection to the user.
Data in transit: Data in transit is protected by HTTPS at all stages: from phone
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browser to SCWS, RAS to SCWS and between the VWC and VWS. HTTPS is the de
facto protocol used whenever security is needed on the Web. There are recent attacks
reported against HTTPS [117], but HTTPS provides reasonable protection against
eavesdropping and man-in-the-middle attacks.
Replay attacks: Replay attacks do not work as a particular OTP is used only once
and is valid for a short time period.
Geolocation: IP spoofing [135] can also compromise the login process. IP geolocation
can be spoofed by a motivated attacker [136], but including it in the protocol adds an
additional obstacle for an attacker. Even though IP spoofing is not extremely difficult,
the attacker also needs to know the location of the user/phone at the exact time of
the attack and simultaneously prevent the user from submitting the OTP through the
genuine client. Geolocation checking is aimed against distant attackers, because if an
attack is mounted within the genuine user’s region it can be easily bypassed. Depending
also on the risk appetite of the VW owners, the location of the phone may be used as an
indicator to proceed with extra levels of protection. The VWS can store all locations
that the user authenticated from and use it to identify whether to fall back to extra
levels of protection, e.g. if a user never logged in from a specific location then the user
is asked for the OTP whereas if this is a known location, then the user is not asked
to provide the OTP, thus steps 9-16 can be omitted. However in this thesis we do not
consider this option although such functionality may exist.
6.5 Formal Analysis of the Protocol
This section describes the formal/verification analysis of the protocol presented in this
chapter. The basic entities are U (User), VWC (Virtual World Client), VWS (Virtual
World Server), LS (Login Server), RAS (Remote Admin Server) and the SCWS. Next
to them are the claims for each of these entities and possible attacks are defined in
the last two columns. Figures 6.6, 6.7 and 6.8 present the analysis of the protocol by
Scyther. The relevant code can be found in Appendix C. Scyther identified two attacks,
as shown in Figure 6.9.
The first attack assumes that there is a malicious redirection to a fake SCWS. While
this is not impossible, i.e. the user being tricked to submit the PIN to a phishing
website appearing to be the one served by the SCWS, we anticipate that the attack
will not offer any advantages to the attacker, since the PIN alone cannot create the
OTP that will allow the attacker to login as the user. The attacker will need the nonce
too, which is delivered to the SCWS over a secure protocol (HTTPS). So, unless the
attacker is able to break the HTTPS connection, then the PIN alone cannot be used
to successfully login.
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Figure 6.6: Virtual World Protocol Formal Analysis (1/3)
The second attack is just a false positive. The tool assumed that “Secret” is an en-
tity that the user is sending the PIN and the OTP to, whereas the intention of using
“Secret” in the code was to establish both the PIN and the OTP as two secret values
known to the user.
6.6 Conclusion of the Chapter
This chapter depicted a way of using the SCWS during the authentication process on
the Web and more specifically during a login to a VW. An OTP creation inside the
SIM card along with geolocation services, provide a certain level of assurance for a safe
login process.
In the next chapter, the idea of using the SCWS to secure the Web will be expanded
to the so-called Web of Things (WoT). The WoT is a subcategory of the Internet of
Things (IoT) that aims at using web technologies within the realm of the IoT, mainly
helping defeat interoperability issues. However, security is still being left aside, in favor
of dealing with these interoperability issues first. Unfortunately, this is creating a risky
position and this thesis aims to help establish an improved position in terms of security
and more specifically tries to defeat authentication, to the WoT, issues.
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Figure 6.7: Virtual World Protocol Formal Analysis (2/3)
Figure 6.8: Virtual World Protocol Formal Analysis (3/3)
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Figure 6.9: Virtual World Protocol Attack
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This chapter is based on the paper A Smart Card Web Server in the Web of Things,
SAI Intelligent Systems Conference 2016 September 21-22, 2016, London, UK.
In the previous chapter we presented a way to allow the authentication of users in
a virtual world environment through the use of a phone enabled with a SCWS. Up
until now, the SCWS was used with the assumption that it is hosted on a phone (or
additionally with a conventional credit/debit card as we have seen in Chapter 5). This
chapter will extend its use to allow the SCWS to function in the wider Internet of
Things and more specifically a subset of the Internet of Things, the Web of Things
(WoT). This will be accomplished through the use of the so-called ‘Security Modules’,
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i.e. smart card chips that host a SCWS. These modules will be deployed throughout
a location and will provide content to authorised entities in a secure and standardised
way. Access to the modules will be given to these entities, after they have authenticated
using a single sign-on solution that is also based on the use of a SCWS.
7.1 Introduction
The World Wide Web (WWW) is an almost ubiquitous technology. Since its intro-
duction, it has changed the way we communicate, shop or even socialize and is now
considered a vital part of everyday life. In recent years there has also been work to-
wards technology that aims to connect everything in a communications network, the
so-called ‘Internet of Things (IoT)’. The IoT promises integration of all things in one
large network, whether they be smart phones, computers, sensors, cars, meters, house-
hold appliances or tagged objects. The goal is not just communication, but widespread
interaction to provide new and/or improved services.
Unfortunately, interoperability problems are currently inhibiting progress towards the
IoT vision, resulting in isolated islands of connectivity using proprietary protocols. One
approach to this problem is to create a ‘Web of Things (WoT)’, in which standardised
web protocols are used to achieve the widespread connectivity required by IoT. Core
to the WoT approach is the fact that TCP/IP stacks can be accommodated in devices
with relatively poor computing power and memory. Tiny web servers inside WoT de-
vices can be accessed by standard browsers and associated protocols.
However, the WoT approach comes with security concerns. The emphasis to date
has been primarily on functionality, with security as an add-on. Using web protocols
gives assurance about protocol design, but does not address attacks on implementation
security, which is extremely important with so many accessible deployed nodes.
This chapter proposes a way to deal with such problems, by leveraging standardis-
ation from mobile communications in the form of the SCWS that takes advantage of
the tamper resistant (attack resistant) web server capability of a SIM card. For WoT
we propose a strongly tamper resistant SCWS security module based on a Java Card
v3.0 Connected Edition chip, supporting a TCIP/IP protocol stack. Finally, the chap-
ter also proposes a way for local WoT single sign-on using a smartphone with a SIM
card hosting a standardised SCWS.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 7.2 provides background to
relevant work in this area, Section 7.3 gives information on an alternative solution on
WoT authentication and compares it against the proposal in this chapter, while Sec-
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tion 7.4 introduces our proposal. Example use cases and assumptions are described
in Section 7.5, Section 7.6 outlines the main characteristics of the proposed architec-
ture, Section 7.7 provides calculations for the execution times of the protocol, while
Section 7.8 considers how it would be used for local WoT single sign-on. Section 7.9
gives a preliminary security analysis of the proposal and also discusses its advantages
and disadvantages. Section 7.10 concludes the chapter.
7.2 Related Work
There are various definitions for the Internet of Things and perhaps the first time that
a definition was given in public was during a presentation at Procter & Gamble [137].
However, if we interpret IoT using our own words, we could say that the IoT is the
idea of everyday objects (fridges, ovens, cars, etc.) having network connectivity so that
they can communicate with each other. These objects may have a range of functional
abilities and be ‘aware’ of their own capabilities and in some cases of their environ-
ment, and can act individually (e.g. fridge) or as a group to provide a useful service
(e.g. sensors in a house). The objects can range from everyday items with tags and/or
sensors to major devices such as cars or houses. Recent surveys estimate the number
of these objects to reach many billions by 2020 [138].
The emergence of the IoT is motivating significant research. A useful survey describing
the technologies behind the IoT, the main applications that can be derived from its
use, as well as concerns and issues can be found in [139].
In more recent years the WoT, a subcategory of the IoT has also drawn the atten-
tion from the research community. In [140], [141] and [142] the authors describe how
they can integrate devices into the Web using the Representational State Transfer
(REST) architecture, giving an even more detailed presentation in [14]. Another pre-
sentation on WoT issues including technologies, security, privacy and implementation
can be found in [143]. Implementation discussions can also be found in [144] where the
authors describe a number of prototypes they created. In [145] the authors describe
the use of a gateway in order to access sensor nodes that cannot use web protocols.
In [146] the idea of using web technologies with home appliances for home automation is
presented, while in [147] the researchers describe a framework for the WoT, illustrated
by a prototype motion detector system.
The above solutions define the idea around the WoT, however none of them addresses
the issue of authentication in the WoT realm and how to enable secure communications
between entities participating in the WoT. With the solution presented in this chapter
we aim to propose an answer to this problem through a single sign-on (SSO) solution
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and the use of established protocols like TLS. We acknowledge that TLS is not suitable
for sensors and miniature tags, but the devices that we are considering in this chap-
ter have significant power to support protocols that require bigger amounts of power
and our aim is to research the feasibility of using such protocols in the realm of the WoT.
For this proposal we will use the SCWS to serve content to clients running on a reader
that interacts with the SIM card (usually the client is the browser on the mobile phone).
For this chapter we are extending the idea of the SCWS by integrating it with objects
that participate in the WoT - an SCWS in this case is called a ‘security module’.
7.3 Web of Things Security
A community of developers that are behind the idea of the Web of Things, created a
GitHub project to assist collaboration. It can be found in [148], but unfortunately it
does not seem very active. The GitHub project contains a part about the security of
the WoT and the administrators of the project.
It is interesting to read that they too recognise the necessity for security in the WoT,
but acknowledge that most of the things lack such security.
The authors of the web page describe a number of possible attacks against the things,
such as capture attacks where the attacker aims at compromising a thing, in order to
steal information, disrupt it or manipulate it, creating safety risks where the crooks
aim at exploiting a thing in order to threaten the physical security of a heart pump or
a camera and even be used to attack other systems, by facilitating a DDoS attack.
7.3.1 Authentication
Authentication in the WoT, is happening through the use of Public Key Infrastructure
(PKI). All parties are identified by their public key, humans and things alike.
To manage this functionality, there exists a security agent software module. This
module is either part of the thing (if it is powerful enough) or resides on an IoT gate-
way whenever the things have very low resources and cannot implement the necessary
TCP/IP stack and support public key cryptography operations. The agent is responsi-
ble for authentication, authorisation and integrity. The agent creates a private/public
key pair for each of the things and all participating entities publish their public keys
to the network, so that they can be searchable by other entities. The system is also
enforcing access control lists to identify the level of access on each of the things.
The authors then describe the algorithms that can be used and propose the use of
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Eliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), since it is more suitable for these devices, after
a comparison against an RSA implementation. Finally, they provide a UML diagram
that describes the whole architecture.
The use of private/public key is important for our solution as well, so at this level
the proposal in this thesis and the proposal of the authors is similar. However, our
solution relies on the already proven TLS protocol, whilst the other solution is unclear
on this.
Another important aspect is that they do not define, where will the private keys of
the users going to be stored. Every system that relies in a public/private key needs a
secure hosting environment for the private keys of all entities. It is not clear in that
proposal, where will all these keys going to be stored, and although an assumption is
that some of the things may allow for a secure hosting environment, they do not define
something similar for humans.
Our solution uses a security module for all entities. The security module can be attached
on the electronic assembly, be a smart card or simply reside inside the (U)SIM card in
a user’s phone. The outcome is that all authentication credentials (public/private keys
and PINs/passwords) are securely stored.
7.4 Proposal Overview
Our proposal is built around the use of strongly tamper resistant security modules em-
bedded in all communicating objects that collectively provide the security foundation of
the entire WoT. Fundamental to this is the ability for entities to securely authenticate
each other prior to transactions. A security evaluated smart card chip supporting Java
Card v3.0 Connected Edition functionality is used as our security module. We chose
this chip, as it can be integrated in an environment where secure access and storage
of information is needed, but at the same time is easily accessible to external entities
(readers, phones) without the need for proprietary protocols. Communication may take
place over TCP/IP and, so standard HTTP clients may be used, notably web browsers.
Additionally, Java is one of the most popular programming languages and the required
development would be very similar to application development on conventional Java
smart cards.
To briefly recap we are proposing an attack resistant chip, hosting an SCWS that
can serve (via the WoT context), trusted web content via standardised web protocols
and is relatively simple to program and manage. For the rest of the chapter, these
tamper resistant SCWS chips will be called security modules. For the communication
117
7.5 Example Use Cases
channel we chose to examine Bluetooth Low Energy and Wi-Fi Direct, although other
candidates included Near Field Communication (NFC) and cellular. Bluetooth LE is
the main candidate as its requirements in power are minimal compared to other tech-
nologies.
We have to note that our security modules are in general much more powerful than
traditional things. So, the overall estimates and assumptions of this chapter will not
apply to an environment where predominantly lightweight sensors/tags are used. In
our use case the smart card chips can be attached to an electronic assembly and then be
integrated to items of higher value, thus allowing for better performance, safer storage
and execution times and easier access from readers. This electronic assembly with the
security module can then be attached to items of relatively high value, e.g. a painting
or a large box full of items of smaller value, thus making our solution not suitable for
use with tags or minimal sensors.
7.5 Example Use Cases
An example use case could be a product logistics scenario and in particular the interac-
tion of an employee’s smartphone with the security modules within a warehouse. The
employee can authenticate to his phone’s SIM card (this SCWS will be called ‘local
server’ for the rest of the text) and then be able to extend this authentication to other
devices with SCWS capability (offered by the security module) in order to access data
and functionality spread throughout the local area. We have to note though that the
use of a smartphone is not mandatory and any other reader can be used instead - the
only requirement is that the reader should be able to communicate over TCP/IP and
offers a Graphical User Interface (GUI) (like a web browser).
Another use case could be a logistics warehouse, containing a number of crates, where
each of the crates has attached one of these security modules. The modules host all
necessary information about the contents of the crates and this information is accessi-
ble to only legitimate employees and without the need for Internet (or other) connection.
A third use case can be when these modules are attached to items of high value, so for
example if an item needs to be transferred from one location to the other, the details
of the recipient (address, phone, etc.) can be accessible to the transport employee in a
secure way, without any further equipment and/or infrastructure needed (like Internet
connection).
7.5.1 Assumptions
For our proposal to work properly we have to consider the following assumptions:
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1. The SIM cards cannot be directly controlled by any other entity besides the MNO.
Thus we assume that the MNO is trusted and that it allows access to the SIM
card (for servlets that will be used by the SCWS to run inside the local server).
2. We do not consider managerial issues in this chapter, but rather we anticipate
that there is a secure procedure for the development, deployment and revocation
of certificates and key pairs on the various phones.
3. As mentioned above, we assume that the security modules are installed on items
that have a significant value, e.g. a fridge, a painting, etc. or any other expensive
item and they are not used with tags or other minimal sensors.
4. We assume that the security module receives accurate external time from an
external timer found on the electronic assembly.
7.6 Architecture/Protocol
Our tamper resistant SCWS chips may be deployed to provide authenticated access
to sensitive information about the products found inside a warehouse. We rely on
the attack resistance of these security modules to provide assurance that the chip’s
stored data, access control and functionality will remain as intended. Furthermore any
additional application dependent functionality/data hosted on the security module is
expected to be simple enough to be rigorously security evaluated e.g. against common
criteria. Since the security module is going to be serving sensitive information only to
trusted parties, there must be a way of authenticating entities requesting to access this
information - the solution should be able to fulfill the requirements described below.
1. The local server should authenticate the user1.
2. The security module should authenticate the local server and vice versa.
A high level diagram of our proposal can be seen in Figure 7.1.
In principle a user could be authenticated directly to all security modules via a unique
password or a PIN that is stored in each of these modules, although this would rapidly
become impractical as the number of modules and users grow. Our proposal assumes
that each user has a single PIN/password. This PIN/password allows the user to au-
thenticate to the SIM card local server and the authentication result is later used for
authenticating with security modules located around the area. A security module will
accept the local authentication result, since it trusts the tamper resistant local server
that authenticated the user in the first place. Procedures would be used to ensure that
1For a more complicated solution there may be mutual authentication between the local server and
the user’s browser through the exchange of certificates. We will not consider this option for this chapter.
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Figure 7.1: High Level Diagram
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the user PIN/password was chosen, stored and updated in accordance with security
best practice. The local server will create an authentication token that will pass over
to the security module for the latter to provide access for a specific duration of time.
The authentication token will have the following attributes:
• An attribute specifying the level of access granted by the authentication token
(represented as L in Figures 7.2 and 7.3), e.g. administrative or standard access.
• An expiration date/time, represented as T.
• A value provided that will identify a unique SIM card, so that the authentication
token will not provide access to other SIM cards. This value can be the Integrated
Circuit Card Identifier (ICCID) that uniquely identifies a SIM card, represented
as I.
Thus, an authentication token could be represented as the concatenation of the above
attributes (L||T ||I).
The above can be seen in Figures 7.2 and 7.3.
We can summarise the authentication process in the following steps (Figure 7.2 repre-
sents steps 1 to 6, while Figure 7.3 represents steps 7 to 12):
1. The user starts the web client (browser) on the reader and starts negotiating a
TLS connection to the local server (this is the first TLS handshake) - for TLS
see [149].
2. The local server prompts the user for her password (or PIN). This is the ‘Pass-
wordRequest’ HTML page.
3. The user provides the password/PIN to the local server.
4. The local server calculates the hash of the user’s password and compares it to a
pre-stored value.
5. The user is notified about the result. This is the ‘PasswordResult’ HTML page.
6. If the password/PIN is correct, the local server creates an authentication token,
signs it and stores both inside the SIM card. The signature is created by the
private key that is part of the key pair already present in the SIM card where the
local server is host and can be later used to verify the integrity and authenticity
of the token.
7. The user initiates a wireless connection with the security module using her reader.
The two entities (local server and security module) negotiate a TLS connection.
8. After the second handshake is finished, the security module asks for the authen-
tication token, from the local server. This is the ‘AuthTokenRequest’.
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Phone Browser Local Server Security Module
ClientHello
ServerHello
Certificate
ClientKeyExchange
[ChangeCipherSpec]Finished
[ChangeCipherSpec]Finished
(PasswordRequest)HTTPs
(Password)HTTPs
Hash(Password)
Check Hash(Password)
(PasswordResult)HTTPs
Create (L||T||I)
Store (L||T||I)
Create (L||T||I)sign
Store (L||T||I)sign
Figure 7.2: User Authentication and Token Generation
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Phone Browser Local Server Security Module
ClientHello
ServerHello
ServerCertificate
CertificateRequest
ClientKeyExchange
ClientCertificate
[ChangeCipherSpec]Finished
[ChangeCipherSpec]Finished
(AuthTokenRequest)HTTPs
((L||T||I)||(L||T||I)sign)HTTPs
Verify
(L||T||I)sign
Check
(L||T||I)
(Information)HTTPs
Figure 7.3: Object Authentication and Access
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9. The authentication token and the accompanying signature are transferred to the
security module over the established wireless connection.
10. The security module checks the validity of the new authentication token, i.e.
makes sure that the token has not expired. It also verifies the signature of the
token using the public key of the local server that it received during the TLS
handshake. Note: The certificate may already exist on the security module, so
there is no need to be transfered during the handshake. However this is a case
that will not be considered in this thesis.
11. If both are legitimate, then the security module grants access to the user to the
information stored on it. If not, then the token and the signature are discarded
and the user is notified.
12. The requested information is sent to the browser over the established connection.
We have to note, that the first part of the protocol can be avoided in case the token
is still valid i.e. the user does not need to provide her PIN/password every time, but
rather the process can proceed to the second part directly. This check is taking place
inside the SIM card/local server - so the user needs to resubmit the PIN/password only
when the token stored inside the SIM card has expired. The trust relationship between
the local server and the security module means that the latter will accept the token’s
validity.
By always submitting the authentication token during the second part of the protocol,
we ensure that the security module always gets and checks the freshest available token.
Between a successful authentication attempt and a subsequent one, the user may have
re-authenticated to the local server (thus expanding the validity of the authentication
token) or her authentication level may have changed, so that now she may access less
or more information. Furthermore in the case of a lost or stolen reader, the authentica-
tion token could be erased from the SIM card/local server, so that the non-authorized
entity that may try using it to access a security module, will have to re-authenticate
(in order for a new token to be created). However, the malicious entity will not know
the PIN/password, thus adding another layer of defense for our solution. If the token
had to be stored in each of the security modules that the user requested access to, then
the tokens would have to be erased from all these modules to block malicious users.
7.7 Process Duration Time Estimation
For the purpose of calculating the overall time needed for the whole process to finish
and the user to start receiving information/data in her browser, we wished to consider
a modern Java Card v3.0 Connected Edition. Unfortunately at the time of writing,
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these cards were not available for the study (thus limiting the practical part of our
research) and for our estimated calculations we had to use figures based on Java Cards
of the previous generation (v2.2). Our aforementioned calculations are based on results
that we gathered during other experiments (for example time needed for an encryption
of X bytes to occur), as well as on data that we received from a leading smart card
chip manufacturer. This manufacturer provided real figures (for the most powerful of
the smart cards that they produce) for a number of actions like RSA signing/verifying,
SHA-256 hashing, etc. using a crypto co-processor (please see Table 7.1). For the
communication between the browser and the local server, we assumed the use of three
different standardised communication channels: conventional ISO 7816, USB1.x and
USB2.0 [26]. For the (wireless) communication channel between the local server and
the security module we used Bluetooth Low Energy and Wi-Fi Direct.
We separated our calculations into two phases: the first phase is between the browser
and the local server (thus, the SCWS inside the SIM card), while the second phase is
taking place between the reader/SIM card and the security module. As can be seen in
Figures 7.2 and 7.3, the messages are presented with the handshake broken down to
its basic parts. For each of these messages we calculated the time for the message to
be transmitted and/or the time for the basic action to occur, such as an encryption of
certain amount of data or the verification of a signature.
Table 7.1: Algorithm Speeds
Action Algorithm Timings
Symmetric Encryption/De-
cryption
AES-128 0.2ms/block
Asymmetric Signing RSA-2048 150ms for 2048bits
Asymmetric Verification RSA-2048 9ms for 2048bits
Hashing SHA-256 0.5ms/block
The amount of data exchanged for the handshakes, the size of password, password
hash and authentication token that were processed at each step can be found in Ta-
ble 7.2 - please refer to Figures 7.2 and 7.3 for detailed information about the contents
of each of the protocol steps. For messages exchanged over HTTPS we included a
further overhead for the TLS headers. The page size represents the HTML page that
was created by the local server and send to the phone’s browser. The HTML page
is represented as PasswordRequest which is a page created by the local server for the
user to input her password and PasswordResult, where the user is informed about the
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password checking result.
Before running the calculations we anticipated that the bottleneck for the whole proce-
dure might be the wireless interface between the reader and the security object and (if
used) the conventional ISO 7816 interface between the phone’s browser and the SIM
card. Thus, we concentrated our attention to the comparison of the various available
communication channels that we could use, i.e. ISO 7816, USB1x and USB2.0 for the
communication between the SIM card and the browser (‘wired’ communication), and
Bluetooth LE and Wi-Fi Direct for the ‘wireless’ interface.
Table 7.2: Amount of Data
Data Amount (in bytes)
First TLS handshake 5149
Second TLS handshake 9399
Password 9
Password hash 32
Authentication token 36
HTML page (incl. TLS headers) 70
Times for data transit of all messages between the entities can be seen in Table 7.3
(calculations in milliseconds). This table does not include the processing time for ac-
tions on the data (can be found in Table 7.4), but the times depicted are the summary
transit times for both parts of the protocol (e.g. transit over ISO 7816 for the first part
of the protocol and transit over Bluetooth LE for the second part). Next to each of the
options the reader can find the assumed communication speed for each. ISO 7816 has
a broad range of communication speeds depending on the hardware and the vendor, so
we selected an average figure. The same principle was applied to the rest. It must be
noted that the theoretical speed for each of the interfaces is larger, but we chose to use
a figure representing an average used/found in practice.
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Table 7.3: Transit Times per Communication
Channel in ms
Wired Protocol
Wireless Protocol
Bluetooth LE (0.1 Mbit/s) Wi-Fi Direct (54 Mbit/s)
ISO 7816 (0.1 Mbit/s) 1967.04 1208.69
USB1.x (12 Mbit/s) 769.82 11.47
USB2.0 (80 Mbit/s) 761.27 2.92
Table 7.4 depicts the time needed for the most important calculations to finish. This
processing includes the TLS handshake with the verification of certificate signatures,
hashing, encryption/decryption of data to be transmitted over TLS and authentication
token signature creation (we assume that both chips, in the SIM card and the security
module, are of equivalent power).
Table 7.4: Calculations Times
Action Size of data (in
bytes)
Time (in ms)
Signature Verification 256 9.00
Data Hashing (per certificate) 1500 12
Auth.Token Signing 256 150
Data Encryption/Decryption
(SIM card and Security Mod-
ule)
52 0.8
Password Hashing (for 9 bytes
password)
32 0.5
Table 7.5 depicts the overall time for each of the phases, i.e. it is the summary of
all calculations to occur.
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Table 7.5: Total Calculation Times per Phase
Phase Time (in ms)
User Authentication and To-
ken Generation
216.40
Object Authentication and
Access
143.60
Table 7.6 gives the overall time needed for the whole process to conclude. Our esti-
mated calculations show that the communication speed is dominating the duration of
the process (compared to the processing), especially when the combination is for ISO
7816 along with Bluetooth LE (for the wireless interface between the security module
and the reader).
We can see in Table 7.6 that the combination of Bluetooth LE with ISO 7816 is almost
7 times slower than the equivalent combination of Wi-Fi direct and USB2.0.
Table 7.6: Total Times in ms
Wired
Wireless
Bluetooth LE WiFi Direct
ISO 7816 2327.04 1568.69
USB1.x 1129.82 371.47
USB2.0 1121.27 362.92
7.8 Local Single Sign-On
At the beginning of the chapter we discussed about how our proposal provides a single
sign-on (SSO) solution that will allow users to authenticate in a de-centralised fashion
in their phones/readers and then be able to access information found on security mod-
ules. We now describe how this can be accomplished.
The idea of SSO is not new: in fact it is a well established technology and there
are many, free and commercial, SSO product solutions. While products have different
features, the basic idea behind SSO is that a user authenticates to just a single central
server, which then handles the user’s authentication to other participating servers. One
of the most prominent of these solutions is OpenID [51] that is being used by a large
number of websites and most recently, social media solutions like Facebook Connect
allow users to authenticate anywhere using their social media account [150].
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One of the most important protocols for SSO is the Kerberos protocol developed by
MIT [151]. Kerberos is used with many solutions/platforms, the most prominent of
which are the Windows OSes developed by Microsoft [152]. In a nutshell, Kerberos
allows users and systems to obtain a ‘ticket’ from a Kerberos Key Distribution Center
(KDC) and use this ticket as their credentials when required to access other entities
within the network. These entities trust the Kerberos ticket credentials and so allow
access from the users/systems that were previously authenticated by the KDC.
Our proposal uses ticket credentials, but is otherwise a different approach. The user is
now the ‘owner’ of the authentication server, within the SCWS/local server of the SIM
card. The credentials of the user are stored inside the SIM card (which is a tamper re-
sistant device). The user authenticates to the local server, and the SCWS then creates
a token that the user can use anytime to access a security module. An advantage of
this approach is that there is no centralised equivalent to the KDC, so no single point of
failure or target for Denial of Service or other hacking attacks. Of course, there should
be a general trust relationship between all the entities used in the system and this can
be achieved by a conventional X.509 certificate approach. Once the local server and the
security module mutually authenticate, the security module retrieves the token stored
in the SIM card and the user is authenticated if the token is valid and fresh.
7.9 Security Analysis
7.9.1 Advantages
We based our security module on a smart card chip because such chips can be strongly
tamper/attack resistant. Modern high quality chips will have effective defenses against
physical probing/modification, side-channel and fault attacks and can be independently
evaluated against common criteria. In short, providing weak devices are avoided, we
expect the module to protect the integrity and access of sensitive stored data and to
function as per design/expectation, even when subjected to aggressive attack.
In any case no sensitive data is available without authentication and no sensitive trans-
missions are in clear. The same levels of protection are offered by the local server.
One of the biggest advantages in favor of our proposal is achieving interoperability,
without compromising on the tamper resistant security of the solution. All involved
entities communicate over TCP/IP channels, thus making them accessible from any
platform that supports this protocol suite i.e. practically everything in the modern
Internet. An attack resistant web server stored inside a security module (chip) imple-
menting a TCP/IP stack means that is easily accessible using standardised protocols
and can be incorporated within an WoT architecture that requires all the involved
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entities to be accessible over ‘web’ standards. The lack of need for special protocols
and proprietary communication methods allows for easier integration in any environ-
ment, and application development is straightforward for anyone familiar with Java
and/or smart card programming. The attack resistance of the security module and the
equivalent attributes of the SIM card (where the initial authentication is taking place),
protect the data and functional implementation (contained within the chip). Logical
attacks (against the design) cannot be avoided, but the small attack surface of the
web servers and the servlets involved, provide a certain assurance level that the pro-
grammers can develop robust and security verified code. Another important factor is
that all communication is taking place over secure channels and more specifically using
HTTPS. Attacks against HTTPS exist [153], however the vast majority of web servers
throughout the Internet rely on HTTPS to secure communication to and from them.
Until proven otherwise, HTTPS is still the most secure way to browse the Internet and
as such should be acceptable for WoT.
Another potentially important factor (which we consider a strong privacy advantage
of our proposal) is that the user’s password/PIN stays within the local device and is
checked by the local server (within the trusted SIM card). The PIN is exposed to
the browser (when it is submitted by the user), however even if malware captures the
password/PIN, a malicious user also has to be in possession of the exact SIM card in
order for her to use it (because the password/PIN can be used with one SIM card only
as it is stored in it and checked by it). So, even if an attacker steals the password/PIN,
she will need not be able to use it effectively, unless she is in possession of the SIM card
as well. Also, if the attacker steals the authentication token, she will not be able to
use it, since the authentication token can be used by one SIM card only (identified by
the ICCID). Furthermore, the attacker needs to be in possession of a X.509 certificate
installed within the ‘malicious’ SIM card; this certificate must be signed by the CA
authority that governs the entire system, which means that the attacker either is in
possession of the private key that corresponds to an existing valid certificate or has her
own certificate signed by the CA - the former is quite difficult to achieve and the latter
should be forbidden by CA processes and controls.
The security modules contain all the necessary information about the product(s) that
the user wants to access. Thus, a product can provide this information when tapped
by an authentic user/phone, and without the need for on-line communication. This
stand-alone ability of the chip is very important when an Internet connection is not
present. Finally, a web enabled security module has enough processing power to run
servlets and process data that it stores/receives. Other WoT entities like sensors pos-
sess limited (if any) processing power and in most cases they are just simple conduits
pushing forward information to more capable entities.
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In summary we can say that the main advantages of this proposal are:
1. Interoperability using standardised/proven open protocols.
2. Attack resistance using proven attack resistant devices.
3. Communication exclusively over secure channels via HTTPS.
4. Web protocols that allow the entities in this proposal to seamlessly form part of
the WoT.
5. Stand-alone entities that may provide information without the need for a back
end server/database nor a connection to the Internet.
6. De-centralised single sign-on, thus avoiding single points of failure.
7. PIN/passwords and authentication tokens are useless without the SIM storing
them. Thus the attacker has to be in possession of the PIN/password or authen-
tication token plus the SIM card in question, in order for her to get access to a
security module.
7.9.2 Disadvantages
The importance of mutual authentication cannot be underestimated, however installing
and maintaining a number of certificates with all the accompanying tasks (updating,
revoking) could prove cumbersome. We anticipate that a process of updating the cer-
tificates will be down to policies mandated by the individual case/scenario with the
attack resistance of the chips permitting a longer period of certificate validity, depend-
ing on the value of the information stored on the chips.
Another fact is the cost of the security modules. An assembly with an advanced smart
card chip may be too expensive for use with ‘cheap’ tags/things. So, for our scenario
we assumed the use of these objects with items of generally higher value. For example,
an assembly with a security module can be attached on a painting, on a fridge or on a
palette containing a large number of items. It can then store and protect information
about these items (information for the painting or the contents of a box/palette) in a
tamper resistant way protecting it from malicious entities.
7.10 Conclusion of the Chapter
This chapter presented the idea of extending the SCWS to the IoT/WoT area. This
proposal uses the Smart Card Web Server inside a phone and in a smart card chip
(security module) and allows for secure authentication of users to these security mod-
ules through the use of a single sign-on process. The SSO server is stored on the user’s
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phone (or any device that can support the existence of a smart card with an SCWS) and
allows the user to authenticate to this server with a PIN/password and subsequently
to authenticate to security modules that trust this SCWS.
The next chapter will conclude this thesis.
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Conclusion
The work that was presented in this thesis addressed the research question as declared
in Chapter 1, i.e. the feasibility of an integration into the Web and the WoT of SCWS-
enabled smart cards/SIM cards. This integration was demonstrated through four use
cases that addressed four different security problems/concerns. This work depicted
that this integration is feasible and that SCWS-enabled smart cards can help mitigate
these concerns in an effective way. All four proposals included a well defined protocol
that described the necessary entities that need to be involved in each one, the necessary
steps that have to be taken and any security concerns that may arise.
The first solution as presented in Chapter 4 allows the distribution of the voting pro-
cess in multiple phones. Each user will/can have a voting website hosted locally on her
phone and she will be able to vote even without Internet connectivity. For an attacker
to disrupt the voting process will need to attack all (or a large number) of these phones.
Identifying which phone is going to be used for the voting procedure can be a difficult
task on its own, which means the attacker needs to get hold of information about the
participating phones and then to attack them. Even if the attacker manages to attack
certain phones, not allowing the user to vote, there is always the alternative of the
booth vote. DDoS attacks are thus becoming much more difficult to implement, since
there is not a single point of failure and the voting process is practically distributed
along a potentially large number of phones.
This thesis has also presented, in Chapter 5, a way for the improvement of the se-
curity of e-commerce transactions. Our proposal adds the Smart Card Web Server
to the payment process, which can be used as a secure personal repository for card-
holder data that is only revealed back to the issuer during payment transactions. The
solution makes use of existing and proven protocols (HTTPS), access via standard
browsers, single use virtual card numbers, and complemented by an application level
security solution. Cardholder privacy should be improved and merchant requirements
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for PCI DSS should be avoided (or at least relaxed). As mentioned before, if a user
used this solution with every Internet transaction, she would have never been required
to remember or submit any sensitive cardholder data, thus enhancing the security of
this information. Additionally, merchants may be required to comply with less PCI
DSS requirements, thus making e-commerce processes easier and cheaper for them.
Chapter 6 presented a third proposal, i.e. a method for using the SCWS to enhance
the login procedure of virtual worlds by using one-time passwords and location based
checks. The use of standardised protocols (HTTPS, FAP) along with existing security
hardware (SIM/SCWS) and secure communications, simplifies the design and opera-
tion of the proposal. The preliminary security analysis indicated that the proposal
had promising capabilities to prevent unauthorised access to VWs. The advantage of
our proposal compared to other authentication solutions employed by VWs is that it
uses a second factor of authentication, along with a one-time password combined with
geolocation capabilities. The OTP is recreated inside the SIM card, thus avoiding mal-
ware that may try to retrieve it and the use of the user’s PIN that is used in the OTP
calculation provides and extra layer of security, given the fact that the whole process
runs inside the secure SIM environment. Even if the phone is stolen, OTPs cannot be
created, unless the attacker is in possession of the PIN as well. Using this proposal
mitigates the fears of phishing attacks and makes login process much more secure.
The final proposal was described in Chapter 7 and uses the Smart Card Web Server
both in an attack resistant SIM card (for which it was initially standardised), but also in
a similarly protected smart card chip (security module) embedded within an electronic
assembly. The two entities communicate over a wireless communication channel mu-
tually authenticating each other. This way the web server running inside the security
module accepts the authentication results for the user that was previously authenti-
cated from the SIM card local server. This SSO solution has the advantage of avoiding a
single centralised SSO server as it distributes the authentication process over a number
of trusted local servers found inside SIM cards. The entire solution works even when
there is no network connectivity available, as everything is happening oﬄine. The user
still needs to remember a password/PIN, although capture of this credential is of little
use without the corresponding SIM card.
8.1 Summary
As stated above, this thesis attempted to provide an answer to the question: how can we
use a Java Card v3.0 Connected Edition with a Smart Card Web Server to enhance the
security of web applications and to assist in a more secure authentication in the WoT?
This research question was then ‘divided’ into four subquestions, with each subquestion
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dealing with a specific security threat affecting the Web or the WoT and demonstrated
by equivalent, four use cases. Tables 8.1 and 8.2 summarise the findings of this thesis
and whether our research objectives were met. As these tables depict, we believe that
this thesis managed to successfully reply to the research question as was set in Chapter
1.
8.2 Future Work
The SCWS is a relatively new development in smart card technology, so not every
phone will have the SCWS/SIM required for the solutions proposed in this thesis. In
fact, at the time of writing a SCWS-enabled smart card was not easy to find and use.
Unavoidably the thesis approaches the subject from a theoretical point of view. Future
work can prove the feasibility of solutions presented in this thesis.
Regarding our first proposal, additional enhancements to the model could also be to
allow one phone to process votes from multiple voters. Each voter would need per-
sonalised ballot forms on the SCWS, accessible to them only once they are suitably
authenticated. Confirmation SMS messages from the voting authority could go to a
nominated phone number, not necessarily back to the SCWS/SIM phone used to vote.
Since the SCWS does not need to be online to process votes, the proposed SCWS voting
method could potentially allow a mobile phone to be used as a portable voting booth
in situations with no network connectivity or if certain phones cannot be used to vote
because of an attack. Votes could be stored on the SCWS if there is sufficient storage
capacity (or else encrypted on the phone), then uploaded to the e-voting system at a
later stage, perhaps via a transfer point in a controlled voting kiosk area, or once con-
nectivity is restored. This suggests that the proposed system could be used for voting
in difficult, challenging and resource-constrained environments such as those existing
in remote regions of the developing world. NFC phones and contactless smart card
IDs could provide an alternative, easy to use method for authenticating voters, using
the NFC phone as a smartcard reader. This requires an application on the untrusted
mobile handset, but authentication credentials can be protected in transit through the
phone by encryption. NFC allows the use of an identity token with a strong indepen-
dent linkage to identity, such as a passport or government-issued identity card, e.g. as
in [154]. It is intended that the proposed SCWS e-voting process will be implemented
as a practical system on a range of phones and operating systems to enable testing of
the robustness of the design, its usability, acceptability to voters, and its practicality
in challenging infrastructure-poor situations.
The solution presented in Chapter 5, would be benefited by a practical implemen-
tation that will identify the speed of the whole process and the ease of use for the
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Table 8.1: Summary of Objectives (Chapters 4 and 5)
General Objec-
tive
Risk Result of our Research
Protection
against (D)DoS
attacks
(D)DoS attacks are becom-
ing more powerful and at the
same time more difficult and
expensive to defend against.
Meanwhile, the barrier of dif-
ficulty for launching such at-
tacks is getting lower through
the use of criminal services.
We believe that our objective was
achieved. Our proposal demon-
strated that by distributing a pro-
cess (in this instance e-voting) to
a number of ‘personal voting web-
sites’, makes it much more diffi-
cult for malicious people to launch a
(D)DoS attack, since they will need
to target a large number of different
websites, each one being hosted on a
different phone. Identifying all these
‘personal voting websites’ is in itself
a challenging task, let alone target-
ting all, or at least a large number
of them, in order to affect the voting
process.
Secure e-
commerce trans-
actions and
easier PCI DSS
compliance
The security of e-commerce
transactions is threatened by
malicious people that try to
trick their victims into sub-
mitting their cardholder data
to phishing websites or by at-
tacking merchant shops and
back end servers to steal card-
holder information in large
numbers. At the same time,
PCI DSS compliance is a cum-
bersome and expensive task
for all merchants.
We believe that our objective was
achieved. Our proposal demon-
strated that by using a smart
card/SIM card that hosts a SCWS,
the e/m-commerce experience can
be enhanced for the end user, with-
out having to sacrifice security. The
user does not need to provide any
cardholder data, thus minimising
the risk of phishing attacks. Addi-
tionally, the use of single use credit
card numbers, turns the cumber-
some PCI DSS compliance into a
much easier (and cheaper) task for
merchants.
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Table 8.2: Summary of Objectives (Chapters 6 and 7)
General Objec-
tive
Risk Result of our Research
Safer authentica-
tion for web appli-
cations
End users are constantly
falling victims to phishing
attacks, while certain meth-
ods for second factors of
authentication have their own
weaknesses.
We believe that our objective was
achieved. Our proposal demon-
strated that by using a SIM card
with a SCWS, a user can enjoy the
security of a second factor of au-
thentication offered directly by her
SIM card, without having to install
second factor authentication appli-
cations on the insecure part of the
phone. At the same time, all se-
cret values (PINs, nonces, OTPs)
are transferred over secure channels,
while the authentication process is
further enhanced by the use of ge-
olocation. The proposal used a vir-
tual world as a use case, however it
can be further expanded to more ap-
plications, especially for risk-based
authentication.
Safer authentica-
tion in the WoT
Security in the WoT is not ad-
equate and leaves the things
insecure because of weak au-
thentication practices.
We believe that we mainly achieved
our objective. Our proposal al-
lows for a much safer authentica-
tion in the WoT realm by using a
single sign-on solution that is run-
ning on smart/SIM card that hosts
a SCWS. Additionally, the security
modules are able to participate in
the authentication process and to of-
fer web content to authorised enti-
ties only. Due to the fact that our
research was limited to things with
sufficient processing power, further
research is needed to investigate the
potential expansion of our proposal
to less powerful things.
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users. A very important piece of work will be to identify the feasibility of the integra-
tion of our solution with modern e-commerce and e-payment processes and websites.
Every payment process should be straightforward for programmers to integrate with
a website (possibly through the use of appropriate APIs and sample code), e.g. part
of PayPal’s success is due to the fact that integration of the PayPal button with any
website is quite easy. It must be noted that our solution is not restricted to e-commerce
transactions and future work may be applied to e-government and e-banking services.
A more detailed analysis will also be beneficial for the solution of Chapter 6 in or-
der to fully understand its security properties and a practical implementation of the
protocol would be useful to determine the speed of the various steps and how this would
affect usability. Future work could also include an enhancement to the basic protocol
to be used when a more advanced level of security is required (e.g. VW banking): this
would involve a second OTP input to the SCWS, and sent to the VW via the RAS or
to include a more risk-based approach, e.g. how will the protocol behave if the user is
logging in from a location previously seen or if the location is new.
It will also be very interesting to see a practical implementation of the final proposal
as presented in Chapter 7. The promising distributed SSO that was the core of the
solution has to be examined from a user perspective, but also from a management
point of view. The ease of managing a number of security modules in multiple sce-
narios and use cases will depict the workability of the solution. A very important
fact will also be the calculation of duration of all phases of the solution to identify
the speed of the protocol execution and especially the identification and confirmation
of bottlenecks and of possible improvements considering more communication channels.
A more general ambition would be to influence the development of standards and
specifications for the application of SCWS to IoT/WoT security, and thereby increase
research and business interest in this promising technology, while also to extend our
proposal to other Trusted Execution Environments (TEE) in the Internet of Things
field.
138
Appendix A
Scyther Code (Chapter 4)
Scyther code for the security analysis of the protocol of Chapter 4.
usertype PublicKey;
usertype PrivateKey;
usertype Vote;
usertype String;
usertype Application;
secret https: Function;
protocol Voting(SIM, RAS) {
role RAS {
const PUBV: PublicKey;
const PUBVA: PublicKey;
const PKV: PrivateKey;
const username: String;
const password: String;
const application: Application;
var vote:Vote;
send_1(RAS,SIM, https(PUBV, PUBVA, PKV));
send_2(RAS,SIM, https({username, password, application}PUBVA) );
recv_3(SIM,RAS, https({vote}PUBVA));
claim_RAS1(RAS, Secret, PKV);
claim_RAS2(RAS, Secret, username);
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claim_RAS3(RAS, Secret, password);
claim_RAS4(RAS, Secret, application);
claim_RAS5(RAS, Secret, application);
claim_RAS6(RAS, Secret, vote);
claim_RAS7(RAS, Niagree);
claim_RAS8(RAS, Nisynch);
claim_RAS9(RAS, Alive);
}
role SIM {
const vote:Vote;
var PUBV: PublicKey;
var PUBVA: PublicKey;
var PKV: PrivateKey;
var username : String;
var password: String;
var application: Application;
recv_1(RAS,SIM, https(PUBV, PUBVA, PKV));
recv_2(RAS,SIM, https({username, password, application}PUBVA) );
send_3(SIM,RAS, https({vote}PUBVA));
claim_SIM1(SIM, Secret, PKV);
claim_SIM2(SIM, Secret, username);
claim_SIM3(SIM, Secret, password);
claim_SIM4(SIM, Secret, application);
claim_SIM5(SIM, Secret, application);
claim_SIM6(SIM, Secret, vote);
claim_SIM7(SIM, Niagree);
claim_SIM8(SIM, Nisynch);
claim_SIM9(SIM, Alive);
}
}
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Appendix B
Scyther Code (Chapter 5)
Scyther code for the security analysis of the protocol of Chapter 5.
usertype PublicKey;
usertype PrivateKey;
usertype Vote;
usertype Certificate;
usertype String;
usertype Application;
secret https: Function;
protocol ePayments(MER, USR, SCWS, ISS, ACQ) {
role MER {
const TDLS: String;
const MIDURL: String;
const PRMer: PrivateKey;
const SIG: Nonce;
const CERTMer: Certificate;
const CERTAcq: Certificate;
const MID: Nonce;
const MNAME: String;
const TPAN: Nonce;
const TREF: Nonce;
const sig: Nonce;
const PUBAcq: PublicKey;
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var TPAN: Nonce;
var TREF: Nonce;
var SIGpriss: Nonce;
var PRIss: PrivateKey;
var PUBMer: PublicKey;
var CERTIss: Certificate;
send_1(MER,USR, https(TDLS,MIDURL, {SIG}PRMer,CERTMer,CERTAcq));
recv_4(ISS, MER, https({TPAN, TREF, {SIGpriss}PRIss}PUBMer, CERTIss));
send_5(MER, ACQ, {MID, MNAME, TPAN, TREF, {sig}PRMer}PUBAcq);
claim_MER1(MER, Secret, TDLS);
claim_MER2(MER, Secret, MIDURL);
claim_MER3(MER, Secret, PRMer);
claim_MER4(MER, Secret, SIG);
claim_MER5(MER, Secret, CERTMer);
claim_MER6(MER, Secret, CERTAcq);
claim_MER7(MER, Secret, MID);
claim_MER8(MER, Secret, MNAME);
claim_MER9(MER, Secret, TPAN);
claim_MER10(MER, Secret, TREF);
claim_MER11(MER, Secret, sig);
claim_MER12(MER, Secret, PUBAcq);
claim_MER13(MER, Secret, TPAN);
claim_MER14(MER, Secret, TREF);
claim_MER15(MER, Secret, SIGpriss);
claim_MER16(MER, Secret, PRIss);
claim_MER17(MER, Secret, PUBMer);
claim_MER18(MER, Secret, CERTIss);
claim_MER19(MER,Niagree);
claim_MER20(MER,Nisynch);
claim_MER21(MER,Alive);
}
role USR {
const PIN: Nonce;
var TDLS: String;
var MIDURL: String;
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var PRMer: PrivateKey;
var SIG: Nonce;
var CERTMer: Certificate;
var CERTAcq: Certificate;
recv_1(MER,USR, https(TDLS,MIDURL, {SIG}PRMer,CERTMer,CERTAcq));
send_2( USR,SCWS, https(PIN));
claim_USR1(USR, Secret, TDLS);
claim_USR2(USR, Secret, MIDURL);
claim_USR3(USR, Secret, PRMer);
claim_USR4(USR, Secret, SIG);
claim_USR5(USR, Secret, CERTMer);
claim_USR6(USR, Secret, CERTAcq);
claim_USR7(USR, Secret, PIN);
claim_USR8(USR,Niagree);
claim_USR9(USR,Nisynch);
claim_USR10(USR,Alive);
}
role SCWS {
const MToken: Nonce;
const SToken: Nonce;
var PIN: Nonce;
recv_2(USR, SCWS, https(PIN));
send_3(SCWS, ISS, https(MToken, SToken));
claim_SCWS1(SCWS, Secret, MToken);
claim_SCWS2(SCWS, Secret, SToken);
claim_SCWS3(SCWS, Secret, PIN);
claim_SCWS4(SCWS,Niagree);
claim_SCWS5(SCWS,Nisynch);
claim_SCWS6(SCWS,Alive);
}
role ISS {
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const TPAN: Nonce;
const TREF: Nonce;
const SIG: Nonce;
const PRIss: PrivateKey;
const PUBMer: PublicKey;
const CERTIss: Certificate;
var MToken: Nonce;
var SToken: Nonce;
recv_3(SCWS, ISS, https(MToken, SToken));
send_4(ISS, MER, https({TPAN, TREF, {SIG}PRIss}PUBMer, CERTIss));
claim_ISS1(ISS, Secret, TPAN);
claim_ISS2(ISS, Secret, TREF);
claim_ISS3(ISS, Secret, SIG);
claim_ISS4(ISS, Secret, PRIss);
claim_ISS5(ISS, Secret, PUBMer);
claim_ISS6(ISS, Secret, CERTIss);
claim_ISS7(ISS, Secret, MToken);
claim_ISS8(ISS, Secret, SToken);
claim_ISS9(ISS,Niagree);
claim_ISS10(ISS,Nisynch);
claim_ISS11(ISS,Alive);
}
role ACQ {
var MID: Nonce;
var MNAME: String;
var TPAN: Nonce;
var TREF: Nonce;
var sig: Nonce;
var PUBAcq: PublicKey;
var PRMer: PrivateKey;
recv_5(MER, ACQ, {MID, MNAME, TPAN, TREF, {sig}PRMer}PUBAcq);
claim_ACQ1(ACQ, Secret, MID);
claim_ACQ2(ACQ, Secret, MNAME);
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claim_ACQ3(ACQ, Secret, TPAN);
claim_ACQ4(ACQ, Secret, TREF);
claim_ACQ5(ACQ, Secret, sig);
claim_ACQ6(ACQ, Secret, PUBAcq);
claim_ACQ7(ACQ, Secret, PRMer);
claim_ACQ8(ACQ,Niagree);
claim_ACQ9(ACQ,Nisynch);
claim_ACQ10(ACQ,Alive);
}
}
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Scyther Code (Chapter 6)
Scyther code for the security analysis of the protocol of Chapter 6.
usertype Password;
usertype Location;
usertype Accept;
secret https: Function;
protocol VWAuth(U, VWC, VWS, LS, RAS, SCWS) {
role U {
const ID: Nonce;
const pin: Password;
var OTP: Password;
send_1( U, VWC, ID);
send_9( U, SCWS, https(pin));
recv_10( SCWS, U, https(OTP));
send_11( U, VWC, OTP);
claim_U1(U, Secret, pin);
claim_U2(U, Secret, OTP);
claim_U4(U, Niagree);
claim_U5(U, Nisynch);
claim_U6(U, Alive);
}
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role VWC {
const vwc: Location;
var ID: Nonce;
var OTP: Password;
var acceptance: Accept;
recv_1( U,VWC, ID);
send_2( VWC, VWS, https(ID));
recv_11( U,VWC, OTP);
send_12( VWC, VWS, https(OTP, vwc));
recv_15( VWS, VWC, https(acceptance));
claim_VWC1(VWC, Secret, ID);
claim_VWC2(VWC, Secret, OTP);
claim_VWC3(VWC, Secret, acceptance);
claim_VWC4(VWC, Niagree);
claim_VWC5(VWC, Nisynch);
claim_VWC6(VWC, Alive);
}
role VWS {
var ID: Nonce;
var N: Nonce;
var phone: Location;
var OTP: Password;
var vwc: Location;
var acceptance: Accept;
recv_2( VWC, VWS, https(ID));
send_3( VWS,LS, https(ID));
recv_4( LS, VWS, https(N));
send_5( VWS, RAS, https(N));
recv_6( RAS, VWS, https(phone));
send_7( VWS, LS, https(phone));
recv_12( VWC, VWS, https(OTP, vwc));
send_13( VWS,LS, https(OTP, vwc));
recv_14( LS, VWS, https(acceptance));
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send_15( VWS, VWC, https(acceptance));
claim_VWS1(VWS, Secret, ID);
claim_VWS2(VWS, Secret, N);
claim_VWS3(VWS, Secret, phone);
claim_VWS4(VWS, Secret, OTP);
claim_VWS5(VWS, Secret, vwc);
claim_VWS6(VWS, Secret, acceptance);
claim_VWS4(VWS, Niagree);
claim_VWS5(VWS, Nisynch);
claim_VWS6(VWS, Alive);
}
role LS {
const N: Nonce;
const acceptance: Accept;
var ID: Nonce;
var phone: Location;
var OTP: Password;
var vwc: Location;
recv_3( VWS,LS, https(ID));
send_4( LS, VWS, https(N));
recv_7( VWS, LS, https(phone));
recv_13( VWS,LS, https(OTP, vwc));
send_14(LS, VWS, https(acceptance));
claim_ LS1( LS, Secret, ID);
claim_ LS2( LS, Secret, N);
claim_ LS3( LS, Secret, phone);
claim_LS4( LS, Secret, OTP);
claim_ LS5( LS, Secret, vwc);
claim_ LS5( LS, Secret, acceptance);
claim_LS6(LS, Niagree);
claim_LS7(LS, Nisynch);
claim_LS8(LS, Alive);
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}role RAS {
const phone: Location;
var N: Nonce;
recv_5( VWS, RAS, https(N));
send_6( RAS, VWS, https(phone));
send_8( RAS, SCWS, https(N));
claim_ RAS1( RAS, Secret, N);
claim_ RAS2( RAS, Secret,phone);
claim_RAS3(RAS, Niagree);
claim_RAS4(RAS, Nisynch);
claim_RAS5(RAS, Alive);
}
role SCWS {
const OTP: Password;
var N: Nonce;
var pin:Password;
recv_8( RAS, SCWS, https(N));
recv_9( U, SCWS, https(pin));
send_10( SCWS, U, https(OTP));
claim_ SCWS1( SCWS, Secret, N);
claim_ SCWS2( SCWS, Secret, pin);
claim_ SCWS3( SCWS, Secret, OTP);
claim_SCWS4(SCWS, Niagree);
claim_SCWS5(SCWS, Nisynch);
claim_SCWS6(SCWS, Alive);
}
}
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